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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines U.S. strategic approaches to Ukraine in three major periods: 
World War I; World War I1 and the Cold War; and since Ukraine’s independence in 
1991. Several key factors and tendencies related to U.S.-Ukrainian-Russian relations are 
reviewed throughout these three periods. The main emphasis is on post-1991 American 
strategic approaches to Ukraine. The thesis attempts to define possible future U.S. 
approaches regarding Ukraine and possible challenges in the bilateral relationship. It 
concludes that the strategic partnership that the United States and Ukraine reached in the 
1990s, after almost a century of American indifference toward Kyiv, is in decline because 
American strategic approaches toward Ukraine lack a properly balanced economic 
dimension. Moreover, changes in Russia’s leadership, the U.S.-Russian arms control 
agenda, and U.S. foreign aid trends as well as negative internal political and economic 
factors in Ukraine are combining to lower Kyiv’s place among the priorities of U S .  
strategic policy. However, new business and economic initiatives, analogous to NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace, could provide solutions. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
During the most of the twentieth century, American strategists and policy-makers 
linked the US. strategic approaches to Ukraine or the “Ukrainian question” with their 
“Russia only” approach. For geopolitical or nuclear weapons reasons, Washington 
pushed its policy priorities with Moscow at the expense of the Ukrainians and other 
peoples of Eastern Europe and Eurasia, which struggled for independence. 
American strategists disregarded Ukrainian independence during World War I 
because of the pro-Russian orientation of President Wilson’s Administration, U.S. 
attempts to preserve the Russian state, and its commitment to fighting on the Eastern 
front, and US.  idealism about Russia’s potential democratic future. The Ukrainian treaty 
with the Central Powers in 191 8 was another negative factor in US.  eyes. 
The Americans were reasonably well-informed about the dynamics of the 
Ukrainian movement for independence before and during World War 11. However, once 
again, because of war with Germany, the United States and its allies chose a preventive, 
anti-Ukrainian strategy, working against the Ukrainian independence movement in 
Europe and North America. American and British strategists understood that Ukrainian 
independence would lead to the collapse of the Soviet empire. Geopolitical motives 
prevailed over ideological and moral commitments to support the principle of self- 
determination. The forceful repatriation of Ukrainians by American and British military 
administrations from Western Europe to Stalin’s Soviet Union after World War I1 
represented a continuation of the Anglo-American strategic approach to the Ukrainian 
question. The Soviet Union thereby received the opportunity to survive for the next forty- 
ix 
six years (1945-1991), causing the Cold War and Soviet expansionist efforts around the 
world. During the Cold War, the U.S. strategic approaches to the “Ukrainian question” 
could be characterized as neutral at best; the United States did not attempt to challenge 
the existence and unity of the USSR. 
The Bush Administration attempted to preserve and reform Gorbachev’s Soviet 
Union, and therefore resisted Ukraine’s independence. Various factors-nuclear 
disarmament priorities, American-Ukrainian diaspora pressure, growing ties between 
Ukraine and other countries, the inability of Gorbachev and Yeltsin to keep Ukraine in 
the Moscow-controlled union-pushed the Bush Administration to recognize the 
independence of Ukraine. Bush Administration and early Clinton Administration policies 
nonetheless were based on negative perceptions of Ukraine and pursued a strategy 
exclusively focused on nuclear disarmament. At the same time, these U.S. 
administrations made idealistic mistakes regarding Russia, helping it economically and 
politically, while closing their eyes to Russian behavior and demands in relations with the 
other former Soviet republics. 
Ukrainian nuclear bargaining and Russian anti-Western policies led to the re- 
education of American strategists regarding Ukraine and to the U.S.-Ukrainian strategic 
partnership. This partnership, primarily oriented on the security and defense sphere, has 
helped to develop significant U.S.-Ukraine military cooperation as well as the NATO- 
Ukraine distinctive partnership. In contrast, America’s limited economic engagement in 
Ukraine has created imbalances in the U.S.-Ukrainian relationship. Such imbalances can 
not be sustained for a long period of time and may cause a decline in the strategic 
partnership. In addition, the changes in the Russian leadership, the U.S.-Russian arms 
X 
control agenda, the unpopularity of foreign aid among U.S. policy-makers, and domestic 
problems in Ukraine (the slowness of economic reforms and accusations in corruption) 
could create an unfavorable dynamic in Washington-Kyiv relations. 
This thesis concludes that Ukraine and other non-NATO and non-EU countries 
could become a cordon sanitaire between Russia and the West without organized 
international initiatives in the business and economic sphere, similar in weight and value 
to the Partnership for Peace program. 
xi 
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This thesis examines the origins and content of U.S. strategic approaches toward 
Ukraine from World War I to the present. It also offers judgements about the probable 
fbture dynamics of U.S. strategic approaches toward Ukraine. 
The terminology employed in this analysis should be clarified at the outset. The 
word “strategic” in this analysis means having to do with core security interests. The 
word “approach” means the basic policy attitudes and objectives. The phrase “strategic 
approach” therefore means policies and actions intended to promote favorable conditions 
for the defense and/or pursuit of core security interests. In other words, when we speak 
about the strategic approaches of some states toward others, we are referring to their 
policies about important national interests. In its analysis of U.S. strategic approaches to 
Ukraine, this thesis examines basic national interests, historical experiences, and 
perceptions. The evidence considered includes policy actions as well as official 
declarations. 
During a process underway since 199 1, Ukraine has become a strategic partner of 
the United States and a significant contributor to European as well as global security. 
During his August 1991 visit to Ukraine, U.S. President George Bush expressed doubts 
about the likelihood of Ukrainian independence and indicated a preference for Moscow. 
In contrast, four years later, President Bill Clinton stated that “For America, support for 
an independent Ukraine secure in its recognized borders, is not only a matter of 
sympathy, it is a matter of our national interest as well. We look to the day when a 
democratic and prosperous Ukraine is America’s full political and economic partner in a 
bulwark of stability in Europe.”’ 
Why have American policymakers changed their approach toward Ukraine? 
According to U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, “Everything we’ve done for 
Ukraine-and everything we will do in the future-we do not just because we Americans 
are a generous people, although that is certainly the case. We‘ve done it and we’ll keep 
on doing it also because it is in our own nation’s interest to see an independent, secure, 
democratic Ukraine survive, succeed and prosper.”* 
Why has the independence of Ukraine become important for U.S. strategic 
interests? What are the interests that make Ukraine so significant for the United States? 
For most of the twentieth century Ukraine was not on the U.S. strategic agenda. 
Even though American decision-makers were well-informed about “the Ukrainian 
question,” they saw no need to support the Ukrainian national movement. Furthermore, 
during most of the Bush administration, American officials passively supported 
Gorbachev and Yeltsin instead of Ukraine’s independence and reacted negatively to 
Ukrainian efforts to win freedom from Moscow’s control. The United States recognized 
the independence of Ukraine because of strategic necessity (including factors such as the 
START I and START I1 treaties) and not because of the moral imperative to support the 
principle of self-determination. 
William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President to the People of Ukraine, Volodomyrs’ka Street I 
Plaza, Schevchenko University, Kiev, Ukraine, 12 May 1995, available [online]: 
http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/; accessed 17 March 2000. 
’ Strobe Talbott, Ukraine at Five: A Progress Report on U.S. Policy, Speech to The Washington 
Group 1996 Leadership Conference, Washington, DC, 11 October 1996, available [online]: 
http://www.state.gov/; accessed 17 March 2000. 
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The Bush administration’s approach changed in part because of a new strategic 
concern-Russian instability. Uncertainty about Russia’s future security policy has been 
a crucial factor in the United States strategic approach toward Ukraine. The United States 
is helping to secure Ukrainian independence because the stabilization of Ukraine and its 
integration into the key transatlantic and European institutions such as Partnership for 
Peace will prevent Russia from re-establishing its Eurasian empire. Moreover, Ukraine’s 
independence reinforces the NATO enlargement process and enhances the American 
position in Europe. Beyond broad objectives such as these, the United States does not 
have a general strategy regarding Ukraine. 
The new American approach toward Ukraine since 199 1 has developed in parallel 
with growing uncertainty about the future of Russia and Moscow’s opposition to NATO 
enlargement. U.S. strategists belatedly recognized the important role of an independent 
and stable Ukraine for the security of the NATO enlargement process as well as for 
frustrating Russian efforts to create an anti-NATO military bloc on the basis of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. 
The events that will shape the U.S. strategic approach toward Ukraine in the 
future are unclear. The role of Ukraine in U.S. strategic policy may change because of 
various developments-for example, events in Russia, further pursuit of the START 
process, and/or the construction of new national missile defense capabilities. But Ukraine 
will probably continue to be the strategic partner or the “strategic pivot” of the United 
States in the former Soviet space, depending in part on events in Russia. 
U.S.- Ukrainian relations in the twentieth century concluded with partnership in 
the 1990s. Because of its geographical location, and its economic, political, and military 
3 
weight, Ukraine can significantly influence European security issues. Moreover, relations 
between Ukraine and the United States, as a leader of the Western world, could lead to 
different security arrangements in the post-Cold War era. Because of uncertainty about 
the future of Russia and Russian-Ukrainian relations, the politics of the major Western 
powers toward Ukraine have become one of the long-term transatlantic and European 
security issues. 
The organization and methodology of the thesis reflect the focus on three major 
historical periods in the twentieth century: the conclusion of World War I, which led to 
the collapse of the Russian Empire and the brief appearance on the European map of the 
Ukrainian Republic; “the Ukrainian question” in the period before, during and after 
World War 11; and, finally, the period encompassing the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
America’s uneasy recognition of Ukrainian independence, and the pursuit of Ukraine’s 
nuclear disarmament and partnerships with the West, including the United States. The 
thesis concludes with an analysis of the current strategic approaches of the United States 
toward Ukraine and with reflections on the probable dynamics of the bilateral 
relationship in the future. 
4 
11. AMERICAN STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO UKRAINE 
DURING WORLD WAR I 
The inability of the Ukrainian Rada to gain 
widespread legal and political recognition 
during the turbulent years 19 17- 192 1 , for 
example, was a decisive factor in the 
collapse of the Ukrainian Republic. 3 
The “Ukrainian question,” the issue of Ukrainian independence, has a long 
history for American strategic decision-makers. Paradoxically, the moral foundation of 
American strategic culture did not apply to Ukraine during the most of the twentieth 
century, even though top-level politicians and executives were well informed about the 
existence and nature of the “Ukrainian question.” Great American principles such as self- 
determination and human rights were not applied by Washington to Ukraine. As 
Alexander Motyl has observed, 
The West’s attitude toward Eastern Europe in this century provides 
little support for the view that morality drives policy. In general, the 
West has traditionally supported the political status quo in Eastern 
Europe, even when its own proclaimed principles-whether self- 
determination or human rights-militated against such a po~i t ion.~ 
This chapter seeks to explain why the United States ignored the principle of self- 
determination and refused to recognize Ukrainian independence during World War I. 
This thesis argues that the American strategic approaches regarding Ukraine 
during World War I should be viewed as dominated by a “Russia only” approach for 
many reasons. 
Luciuk, Lubomyr Y .  and Bohdan S. Kordan. Anglo-American Perspectives on the Ukrainian 3 
Question 1938-1951: A Documentary Collection (Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1987), 1. 
Motyl, Alexander J., Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine AferTotalitarianism (New York: 4 
Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 175. 
5 
During the 1917-1918 period, America attempted to preserve the Russian state 
from total collapse and to support as the legitimate Russian government the political 
leaders who would restore order in Russia and who would continue the war. In this case, 
diaspora able to influence the position of the US.  Congress and Administration during 
World War I became a negative factor. Finally, the inability of the Ukrainian government 
to consolidate state power as well as the social-democratic and pacifist orientation of the 
( 
6 
new state contributed to the distance between Ukraine and the Entente powers. 
At the beginning of the break up of the Russian Empire and the emergence of an 
independent Ukraine, the United States tried to preserve the Russian state as a counter to 
German expansion. This was certainly the case during World War I when Russia was its 
war ally and the Entente powers needed the Eastern front to ease the German pressure on 
the Western front. Consequently, even when the Russian Empire collapsed, the United 
States was the first Western power that recognized with “enthusiasm” the first and second 
provisional governments in Russia in March-May 191 7.5 
This enthusiasm can be explained particularly by American idealism and nayvete 
about Russia’s democratic future. This nayve idealism repeated itself many times during 
the twentieth century. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, greeting the new Russian 
provisional government, declared that the goal “to stand side by side, shoulder to 
shoulder against autocracy, will unite the American and Russian peoples in a friendship 
for ages.” In this matter, Secretary Lansing ignored or did not understand the simple 
fact that Russia’s colonial possessions in Eastern Europe and Eurasia gave it only one 
option: to be autocratic or to disintegrate and lose all its territories, with peoples like the 
Ukrainians and the Georgians gaining independence. 
The high level of idealism regarding Russia’s future was evident in President 
Woodrow Wilson’s war message of spring 19 17: “Does not every American feel that 
assurance has been added to our hope for the future peace of the world by the wonderful 
Bemis, Samuel Flagg. The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy. Vol. X. (New 
York Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1963), 107-108. 
Lansing quoted in ibid. 6 
7 
and heartening things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia? 
Russia was known by those who knew it best to have been always in fact democratic at 
heart.. . and now.. . the great, generous Russian people have been added in all their naive 
majesty and might to the forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice, and 
for peace.. .. The world must be made safe for democracy.” ’ 
Even when the Bolsheviks came to power in November 1917 and started to 
negotiate with the Central Powers about withdrawal from the war in 1918, the United 
States continued to treat Soviet Russia as a friendly state. President Wilson held the idea 
of “letting Russia work out her own destiny, partly in the hope that she might yet re-enter 
the war.,’’ The American Ambassador to Russia, D.R. Francis, stated that “his 
government still considered America ‘an ally of the Russian people,’ and as late as May 
31, 1918, Lansing cabled Francis, for publication in Russia, assurances of ‘the friendly 
intentions of the United States toward Russia.’” So, the neglect of ideological 
differences in pursuit of Realpolitik, when the potential allies were involved in a war with 
Germany, was born during World War I and repeated itself during World War 11. The 
U.S. refusal to recognize Lithuania and Estonia was consistent with the desire to 
preserve the territorial integrity of Russia. In 1919, Secretary Lansing “declined to 
recognize the independence of Lithuania on the ground that ‘it has been thought unwise 




and unfair to prejudice in advance of the establishment of orderly, constitutional 
government in Russia the principle of Russian 
In the case of Estonia, according to Matvii Stakhiv, Secretary of State Lansing 
opposed recognition of Estonian government during the Paris Conference of 191 9. “On 
behalf of the United States, he announced, ‘The recognition of de facto governments on 
the territories which have belonged to Russia, would be to some measure a partition of 
Russia, and the United States has carefully avoided this, with the exception of Poland and 
Finland.”’” 
The weight of American commitments to Russia, despite America’s proclaimed 
support for national self-determination, is evident in the following analysis: 
President Wilson had repeatedly manifested his sincere and profound 
friendship for the Russian nation and the Russian people. Russia never had 
a better friend than Woodrow Wilson. Evidences of that friendship are too 
numerous for citation in extenso, but reference may be made to the 
following: (a) the prompt recognition of the provisional Government on 
the fall of tsarism; (b) the American mission to Russia headed by ex- 
Secretary of State Root; (c) the President’s address to Congress, January 8, 
191 8, with its statement of Russia’s rights in the peace settlement; (d) the 
Prinkipo proposal at the peace conference, January 1919; (e) Secretary 
Lansing’s replies to the Lithuanian National Council, October 15, 1919, 
January 7, 1920, with their friendly protection of Russia’s territorial 
sovereignty. Secretary Colby hlly shared the President’s friendship for the 
Russian nation and the Russian people, and one of his first important 
official acts was a manifestation of that friendship.’* 
Ibid., 170. 10 
Stakhiv quoted in Shcherbak, Yuri. The Strategic Role of Ukraine: Diplomatic Addresses and I 1  
Lectures (1994-1997) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 
1998), xi-xii. 
Bemis, Samuel Flagg. The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy. Vol. X. (New 
York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1963), 199-200. 
9 
United States relations with Bolshevik Russia subsequently became complicated, 
but this fact did not change the American position on the “Ukrainian question.” 
As a result, the United States attempted to preserve the territorial integrity of 
Russia and to restore the Russian state. Washington therefore resisted recognition of 
Ukrainian independence. In this regard, the former Ukrainian Ambassador to the United 
States, Yuri Shcherbak, alluding to Matvii Stakhiv’s research on Secretary of State 
Lansing’s position regarding Ukrainian independence, wrote that: 
Lansing was resolutely set against the principle of national self- 
determination that was expounded by President Woodrow Wilson among 
his famous ‘Fourteen Points,’ which played a decisive role in the Paris 
Peace Conference in 1919 and 1920. As the Ukrainian historian Matvii 
StaWliv has recently confirmed, “Lansing often concealed from Wilson 
intelligence reports that were favorable toward Ukraine and presented to 
Wilson only those that were unfavorable.” Lansing, being an ardent 
Russophile, came out decisively in favor of the inviolability of the Russian 
Empire.I3 
Moreover, in 1920, Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby even proposed a plan of 
“the voluntary return of Russia to the family of nations.” This plan was to negotiate with 
Lenin’s government about “the voluntary liquidation of the dictatorship, the 
basing of the government of Russia upon ‘the sanction of the authentic organs of Russian 
14 people,’” and Western economic assistance. This plan failed, but it showed the depth of 
U.S. commitment to a unified Russia. 
I’ Stakhiv quoted in Shcherbak, Yuri. The Strategic Role of Ukraine: Diplomatic Addresses and 
Lectures (1994- 1997) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 
1998), xi. 
Bemis, Samuel Flagg. The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy (New York: 14 
Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1963), 206. 
10 
In sum, Ukraine’s hopes to secure recognition of its independence from the 
United States and the other Western powers were doomed from the beginning for many 
reasons. The Entente powers valued Russia’s military potential and recognized the 
political forces which were attempting to restore the Russian state and continue the war 
as the only legitimate Russian government. 
During the crucial period the Allies in Paris, including the American 
Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, categorically refbsed to recognize 
Ukraine’s independence and to extend any assistance to the Ukrainian 
army. The Allies regarded Kolchak and Denikin as exclusive spokesmen 
for the whole of Russia. The Directory, the Ukrainian democratic 
government since December 1918, was rebuffed by the Western 
democracies that preferred to support the remnants of the tsarist Russian 
autocratic regime. 15 
Given the rehsal of the United States and the Entente powers to recognize 
Ukrainian independence and the real threat of a Bolshevik invasion from the North, in 
collaboration with the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, the Ukrainian government was forced to 
search for allies to guarantee its survival. Ukraine reached a peace agreement with the 
Central Powers during the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference. In fact, “The Treaty of Peace 
between the Ukrainian National Republic and the Central Powers” of 9 February 19 18 
reached in Brest-Litovsk, also known as the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, was the first 
international act recognizing the independence and legitimacy of the Ukrainian 
government. This fact became the foundation for further international recognition from 
the neutral states and for military assistance from the Central Powers against the 
Bolsheviks. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty thus became an additional reason for the United 
States to refuse to recognize Ukrainian independence. 
l 5  Horak, Stephan M. The First Treaty of World War I:  Ukraine’s Treaty with the Central 
Powers of Februaiy 9, 1918 (New York: East, 1988) 157. 
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Once Ukraine signed the peace treaty, it foreclosed any possibility of U.S. 
recognition. An independent Ukrainian state, with its political and pacifist orientation to 
World War I, could change the status quo in Europe by decreasing the feasibility of a 
restoration of the Russian Empire or of a strong Russian state, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, would increase the likelihood of German expansion eastward. Moreover, the fact of 
Ukrainian independence and the disintegration of the Russian Empire combined to 
collapse the Eastern front and endangered the Western powers by freeing German 
divisions from the Russo-Gennan front. In these circumstances, America naturally would 
support any Russian regime that would continue the war on the Eastern front. 
Furthermore, all the major powers in World War I had imperial ambitions- 
desires to acquire new temtories and spheres of influences. It is doubtful whether the 
Amencan military intervention in Siberia, Murmansk and Archangel in 1918 can be 
viewed as an attempt to get a “piece of pie” on the ruins of the Russian Empire. But it is a 
historical fact that France and Britain simultaneously attempted to divide some of the 
temtory of the ex-Russian Empire for their spheres of influence, and Japan landed its 
forces in Vladivostok for the same purpose at the same time. 
According to Stephan Horak, Britain and France concluded secret agreements regarding 
the Russian Empire in their attempts to create “spheres of action.” 
The chain of events leading to Brest-Litovsk was unlocked in Moscow and 
not in Kiev. Besides, France and England, too, conspired to divide the 
borderlands of the Russian empire into “spheres of action” as agreed upon 
at the Pans Anglo-French convention of December 23, 1917. The French 
sphere included Ukraine, Bessarabia, and the Crimea; that of England 
12 
consisted of the Don and Kuban regions, as well as the Caucasus. 
Innocence and altruism were not the primary virtues of either side. 16 
An independent Ukrainian state contradicted the desires of London and Paris for 
influence over the territorial heritage of the Russian Empire. 
Finally, the United States did not recognize the independence of Ukraine for 
several reasons. The main reason for non-recognition was the “Russia only” approach. 
From a Realpolitik point of view, the United States was evidently interested in promoting 
the existence of a Russia able to balance Germany and its allies. Moreover, the Entente 
powers would not accept German dominance in Eurasia. The existence of an independent 
Ukraine was contrary to the strategic interests pursued by the Entente powers. 
Other factors reinforced the Realpolitik approach. American leaders had a pro- 
Russian orientation and considered Russia a war ally that was expected to continue the 
fight on the Eastern front. President Woodrow Wilson and Secretaries of State Robert 
Lansing and Bainbridge Colby believed in Russia’s democratic future and attempted to 
preserve Russian territorial integrity after the collapse of the Russian Empire and even 
when the Bolsheviks came to power. 
Furthekore, the Anglo-French convention of 23 December 1917 could be 
viewed as the division of the Russian Empire between France and Britain, while the US. 
role was unclear. This Anglo-French convention gave additional complexity to the 
“Ukrainian question.” Ukrainian independence was not consistent with the Entente 
powers’ desires for “spheres of action.” Ironically, the British and French failure to 
recognize Ukraine and the Ukrainian peace treaty with the Central Powers endangered 
“Ibid., 155. 
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Entente positions. This treaty improved the Central Powers’ resource conditions and 
pushed German expansionist interests toward Eurasia, including Russia as a whole. 
Canadian historian Orest Subtelny has pointed out other causes that explain the 
refusal of the Entente powers to recognize Ukraine. Among the reasons are the following: 
“ignorance of actual conditions in Ukraine, the energetic and effective anti-Ukrainian 
propaganda of the Poles and Whites, the association of the Central Rada and Hetmanate 
with the Germans, and the leftist (‘Bolshevik’) tendencies of the Dire~tory.”’~ 
In summary, Ukraine did not have any chance for recognition of its independence 
from the United States and the Entente powers mainly because of their war aims and their 
position on Russia and because of the Ukrainian treaty with the Central Powers. 
The principle of self-determination was a powerful tool in international relations 
applied by the great powers for the purpose of Realpolitik during World War I. Ukrainian 
Self-determination became a tool between the Entente powers and the Central Powers. 
Recognized by one side, Ukraine was rejected by another. 
Subtelny, Orest. Ukraine: A Histol);. 2d.ed. (Toronto: University Toronto Press, 1994), 379. 17 
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111. AMERICAN STRATEGIC APPROACHES DURING WORLD WAR I1 AND 
THE COLD WAR 
The Anglo-American powers never 
wanted, nor felt they needed a free 
Ukraine. * 
The American strategic approach to Ukraine did not change in principle between 
World War I and World War TI. The traditional American “Russia only” approach was 
maintained without question during the Second World War, because of geopolitical 
interests and the common goal of defeating Nazi Germany. The importance of the Soviet 
Union for the United States and its allies rose in parallel with the increasing power of 
Nazi Germany and was connected to pre-World War I1 geopolitical realities.’’ As 
Alexander J. Motyl has pointed out, Ukraine continued to suffer under Stalin’s 
repressions at the time of the Western diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union and its 
admission into the League of Nations in 1934. Russian territorial integrity was supported 
by the diplomacy of the Anglo-American powers. In contrast, the “Ukrainian question” 
became part of the geopolitical struggle between the Western allies and Russia on one 
hand, and Germany on the other. The Western attitude toward the Ukrainian question 
benefited Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian question became a highly 
regarded war tool for Nazi Germany, while it postponed the USSR’s disintegration for 
forty years. 
During the Cold War, the US. strategy of containment was targeted against 
Soviet expansion, but not against the existence of the Soviet Union. Once again, the 
Luciuk, Lubomyr Y. and Bohdan S .  Kordan. Anglo-American Perspectives on the Ukrainian 
Question 1938-1951: A Documentary Collection (Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1987), 12. 
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Ukrainian movement for independence was sacrificed in order to preserve Yalta’s 
European status quo. 
A. WORLD WAR I1 
At the beginning, it is necessary to point out that the American approach toward 
the Ukrainian question was similar to that of Britain and Canada. As during World War I, 
the United States and its allies were well-informed about the dynamic of the national 
movement of the Ukrainians prior to World War 11, but focused on the balance of power 
in Europe and the ability of the Soviet Union to defend the Eastern front. 2o 
The only new component was an increasingly negative view of the Ukrainian 
national movement by the U.S., British, and Canadian governments. The Ukrainian 
independence movement was viewed though the prism of Nazi war aims and in fact was 
identified as synonymous with them. As a result, the Allies acted against the Ukrainian 
diaspora in their countries during the war, and repatriated Ukrainians from Western 
Europe according to the Yalta agreement after the war. The Anglo-American powers 
believed that the Ukrainian national movement would support the German war plans to 
weaken the Soviet Union and its war efforts. 
The American and British strategists understood that they needed the Soviet 
Union to balance Germany’s power, despite the ideological system of the USSR. 
Ukrainian independence could challenge this status quo assumption and weaken their 
Soviet ally. 
Motyl, Alexander J. Dilemmas of Independence. Ukraine After Totalitarianism (New York: 19 
Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 176. 
Luciuk, Lubomyr Y. and Bohdan S. Kordan. Anglo-American Perspectives on the Ukrainian 
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Question 1938-1951: A Documentary Collection (Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1987), viii. 
The character of the Allies’ position on the “Ukrainian question” was preventive. 
Ukrainian statehood and the Ukrainian national movement contradicted key Anglo- 
American interests before World War 11. The allies feared a repetition of the World War I 
experience-the collapse of Russia and Ukraine’s cooperation with Germany as the only 
power that would recognize Ukrainian independence. Ukrainian statehood could thus 
increase Germany’s survivability and power during the war. In response, the allies during 
World War I1 chose a preventive strategy against the possibility of Ukrainian 
independence and the people who supported this movement in Europe and North 
America. 
The Ukrainian national movement was viewed as a factor that could disturb the 
geopolitical balance in Europe in the 1930s: 
Ukrainian nationalism, as a force which favored a restructuring of the 
political geography of Europe, was generally considered a destabilizing 
factor by the policy-making elites of those states which sought to maintain 
the European status quo. To reduce the political effectiveness of Ukrainian 
separatism, decision-makers - whether in London’s Whitehall or 
Warsaw’s Ministry of External Affairs - often put forward arguments 
intended to counter Ukrainian claims; challenged the idea of a distinct 
Ukrainian nation in ethnological terms; or simply gave precedence to 
geopolitical considerations, suggesting that further temtorial 
fragmentation in eastern Europe would promote regional instability.2’ 
The British were so concerned about the emergence of an independent Ukraine and its 
impact on the Soviet Union during the war that the British Department of Overseas Trade 
prepared a report for the Foreign Office in February 1939.” The report concluded that: 
The loss to the USSR resulting from an independent Ukraine, re-oriented 
as far as possible in a German direction, would be far greater than would 
the economic gain to Germany. It might greatly improve Germany’s 
’‘ Ibid., 2. 
-- Ibid., 49. 77 
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position in peace or war but would not solve all her economic problems. 
On the other hand, since the existence of the Soviet Union depends 
primarily on the maintenance of an interlocked Union-wide economic 
balance, the destruction of this balance wouldpresumably entail the 
collapse of the Soviet regime and therefore a general disintegration of the 
USSR. 23 
As a result of such assessments, American and British diplomatic and intelligence 
activities in connection with the “Ukrainian question” increased prior to World War I1 
and had a preventive character against the attempts of the Germans to exploit the 
Ukrainian national movement. 
The British used Ukrainian nationalist organizations as a tool in the 
struggle against Germany and considered them a possible political and 
military factor had the Soviet Union collapsed.. . But neither Britain, nor 
later America and Canada, was much interested in the real claims of 
Ukrainian nationalist groups, although all three were interested in 
harnessing their economic and social influence.24 
Washington, London and Ottawa coordinated their positions with regard to the 
Ukrainian national movement in Eastern Europe and Ukrainian communities in North 
America and the United Kingdom. In most cases, the position of one ally was adopted as 
the position of the others. 
British unwillingness to accord legitimacy to the concept of Ukrainian 
statehood had its origins in at least several other preconceptions about the 
nature and intentions of the nationalist movement. There was, for 
example, concern over the growing use of violence by Ukrainian 
nationalists against Polish state institutions and representatives. Equally 
important was the British view that Ukrainian irredentism might somehow 
be exploited by Germany.. . Since it was felt that Ukrainian nationalism 
could become a potential political force, British officials decided that it 
would be bear more careful scrutiny. Just before the outbreak of the 
~ ~~ 
’’ Ibid., 49; emphasis added. 
24 Ibid., xxii. 
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~~ ~~ 
Second World War, they would inform their American counterparts of 
their point of view. The latter would, essentially, adopt it. 25 
The Allies’ unwilliness to respond to Ukrainian suffering under Stalin’s regime 
and to honor moral demands in connection with self-determination is described in a letter 
from Mr. T. Philipps, a Canadian official, to T. C. Davis of the Canadian Department of 
National War Services dated 13 April 1941, on “Ukrainian-Canadian Political Attitudes 
toward the War and Allied Position on Ukrainian Independence.” 
Dr. Archer says the Ukrainians [in Canada] are conhsed about the issue in 
E[astern] Europe. Most of us are too. We still cannot tell their 40 million 
kindred in Europe what we will do for them when we win. By caution, we 
do not even tell them that we should like them ... to be able to throw off 
dictatorship, tyranny and enslavement. Our sauce is for geese but not for 
ganders. But Hitler is promising and showing them something quite 
definite. Whatever the Germans offer Ukrainians, it will be better than 
what they suffer now. So the months pass, until a day something will 
Finally, the Allies forcibly repatriated Ukrainians from post-war Western Europe 
to the Soviet Union according to the Yalta agreement. 27 There many of the forcibly 
returned Ukrainians were treated as traitors and sent to Soviet prison camps as criminals. 
Both Western recognition of the Soviet Union and the Yalta world order made the 
Ukrainian issue an internal affair of the USSR, with Moscow the only judge as to 
Ukraine’s destiny. 
us.26 
l5 Ibid., 5.  
l6 Ibid., 84. 
” Ibid., 11. 
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B. THE COLD WAR 
After World War 11, the United States and its allies continued their policy of non- 
recognition of Ukraine. Some interest in Ukraine and the Ukrainian resistance movement 
was raised after World War 11. As Alexander Motyl has pointed out, 
Ukrainians and other non-Russians began to attract the West’s explicit 
attention-not unexpectedly, for exclusively geopolitical reasons.. . . 
American, British, and West German intelligence services attempted to 
cultivate the subversive potential of Ukrainian, Baltic, and other anti- 
Communist resistance movements. 28 
This approach was, however, quite limited and did not form part of the political 
agenda or lead to strategic plans for supporting Ukrainian independence. Alexander 
Motyl has discussed the limits of the U.S. approach. 
American attitudes toward Ukrainians assumed clearer form after the 
outbreak of Cold War hostilities. As Washington first toyed with 
‘rollback’ and finally settled on ‘containment,’ some policymakers 
came to perceive the Ukrainians as a potential source of Soviet 
vulnerability. Limited American encouragement of Ukrainian 
restiveness-through Radio Liberty (nee Radio Liberation) or 
lukewarm CIA support of Cmigrk groups and guerrilla movements- 
continued non-recognition of the incorporation of the Baltic states, and 
the visible brutality of the USSR’s domination of its Central European 
satellites culminated in the passage of the Captive Nations resolution in 
the late 1950s.. .. But that was all.29 
Even the beginning of the Cold War, a period of antagonism and distrust between 
the West and the Soviet Union, did not create alternatives for the Ukrainian people in 
their struggle for independence. 
Motyl, Alexander J. Dilemmas of Independence. Ukraine After Totalitarianism (New York 
Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 177. 
29 Ibid., 177. 
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The Ukrainian Question - even as a military strategic question - faded 
into obscurity, thereafter being discussed only from the viewpoint of what 
advantages might accrue from establishing diplomatic ‘listening posts’ in 
Ukraine. Any kind of brinkmanship involving the Ukrainian Question was 
overruled in the uneasy atmosphere of coexistence which came to 
characterize postwar relations between the Anglo-American powers and 
the Soviet Union.. . Preserving the international status quo, and distancing 
themselves from any political movements challenging it, became and 
remained cornerstones of Western geopolitical thinking. In this context it 
becomes clear that the Anglo-American powers never wanted, nor felt 
they needed a free Ukraine. 30 
Another telling illustration of the U.S. approach to Ukraine during the Cold War 
is the official response of the State Department to the British Chancery in Washington, 
D.C., on 16 December 1949 about the purpose of President Truman’s special message to 
the Fourth Congress of Americans of Ukrainian Descent. 
The State Department also assured us that their policy toward the 
Ukrainian emigre organizations and the Ukrainian separatist movement 
in general remained as before - namely one of neutrality. They did not 
propose at this stage either to play up, or to discourage, Ukrainian 
separatist feeling. 31 
Furthermore, during the Cold War the United States pursued indirect anti-Soviet 
activity, but did not attempt to challenge the existence of the Soviet Union-even though 
the hostile intentions of Moscow regarding the West were obvious. 
The direct consequence of Containment was, therefore, that nationalist 
resistance in eastern Europe, and above all in Ukraine, never received 
more than contingent assistance from the Western powers ... Even such sub 
rosa intervention as did occur was more or less abandoned when the 
Korean War generated new military and political demands, although it is 
also clear.. . that it was periodically reviewed as an ‘indirect strategy’. . . 
Hence, despite many differences over how to operationalize Containment; 
the creation of a permanent conservative caucus in the West which has 
never accepted Yalta; and much rhetoric about ‘Rollback,’ ‘Liberation,’ 
j0 Ibid., 12. 
Ibid., 23 1. 31 
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and ‘Human Rights,’ there has never been a time when any British or 
American government has been willing to sacrifice the bones of its 
Grenadiers to retrieve national societies dominated by Soviet power. 32 
The Anglo-American powers viewed Ukrainian nationalism as weak and 
incapable of challenging Stalin’s regime without direct Western assistance. 
In the main, however, nationalist resistance in Eastern Europe was 
regarded as a futile, fanatical struggle which could not lead to the defeat of 
Soviet Power without war, assisted directly by the West (Document 49). 
That would have meant atomic war, carrying risks and consequences 
which these powers were not prepared to contemplate, even while the 
United States enjoyed a monopoly on nuclear weapons. 33 
The last argument, attempting to put the main responsibility for Westem policy on 
the Ukrainian side, looks realistic in retrospect. When the Ukrainian movement for 
independence did not receive support from the Western democracies, it was suppressed. 
The analysis above shows that twice during the first half of the twentieth century the 
Ukrainian movement for independence was frustrated by Western “Russia only” policies 
that let Germany manipulate the Ukrainian issue as a war tool and that let Moscow 
repress Ukrainian revolt. 
Hugh A. Macdonald has identified four factors affecting the Anglo-American 
approaches regarding Ukraine during this period. First, Ukrainian nationalism was not 
regarded as politically strong. Second, there were many Western suspicions about links 
between Ukrainian nationalist groups in Europe and in Germany in particular. Third, 
j2 Luciuk, Lubornyr Y .  and Bohdan S. Kordan. Anglo-American Perspectives on the Ukrainian 
Question 1938-19.51: A Documentary Collection (Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1987), xxi; 
emphasis in the original. 
Ibid., xxi. 33 
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Britain and the United States had little power in European affairs. Finally, the West’s 
postwar strategy was not to challenge the Soviet Union.34 
In summary, the Ukrainian movement for independence was not a high priority 
for the Anglo-American powers during and after World War I1 for the following reasons. 
The West needed the Soviet Union to fight Germany, and the Anglo-American powers 
did not intend to challenge the USSR’s territorial integrity. It was assumed that the USSR 
would collapse if Ukraine gained independence. Because they feared a repetition of the 
German-Ukrainian cooperation during World War I, America and its allies tried to 
discourage the Ukrainian movement and used preventive measures against its possible 
links with the Germans. The U.S., British and Canadian governments coordinated and 
acted against the Ukrainian diaspora in their countries during World War 11. As during 
World War I, the Anglo-American powers, not willing to support the Ukrainian 
independence movement, viewed Ukraine though the prism of German war aims and as a 
potential German ally. Possibly for this reason (among others) the allies repatriated 
Ukrainians as German supporters after World War I1 and sent them back to the USSR, 
where they suffered from Stalin’s repressions. 
During the Cold War era the United States and its allies were not supportive to the 
Ukrainian movement for independence, except for secondary CIA and other Western 
intelligence services initiatives oriented mainly to “verbal support” through the Voice of 
America and other radio stations. 
bid., xxii-xxiii. 34 
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The U.S. approach on the Ukrainian question can be characterized as neutral 
during the Cold War. During this period, the United States did not challenge the USSR 
on the “Ukrainian question.” The United States did not even explore Stalin’s mistake 
about Ukrainian representation to the United Nations. As Alexander Motyl has pointed 
out, “Not surprisingly, when Ukraine’s Mission to the United Nations in New York 
began taking an independent line in 1990-1991, [U.S.] policymakers could not grasp 
something so seemingly an~rnalous.’’~~ 
For the second time during the twentieth century the Ukrainian people were 
rejected by the Western democracies and lost their chance to gain independence. They 
would not have another chance until the end of the Cold War. The U.S. response to this 
third effort at independence is analyzed in the following chapter. 
Motyl, Alexander J, Dilemmas of Independence. Ukraine After Totalitarianism (New York: 35 
Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 178. 
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IV. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO 
UKRAINE (1991-1992) 
The Bush Administration’s strategic approaches to Ukraine can be divided in two 
periods: before U.S. recognition of Ukrainian independence on 25 December 1991 and 
after it. 
During the first period, the U.S. approach to Ukraine continued to be 
overwhelmingly shaped by the desire to preserve the Soviet Union or any union under 
Russian central control. President George Bush and his aides attempted to discourage the 
Ukrainian movement for independence and attempted to help Gorbachev and Yeltsin 
keep Ukraine inside the union. As during World War I and World War 11, it was clear for 
American strategists that Ukrainian independence would lead to the collapse of a 
Moscow-directed empire. In this case, officials in Washington assumed that the collapse 
of the Soviet Union would be violent (as in Yugoslavia) and that nuclear weapons located 
in breakaway republics could jeopardize world stability. The Soviet movement toward 
nuclear disarmament in the framework of START I, democratization processes in the 
USSR, and Soviet non-interference in the Gulf War were seen as evidence of the value of 
cooperation with: a reforming Soviet Union. Finally, personal relations between 
Presidents Bush and Gorbachev strongly influenced American and other Western views 
on Ukraine. American strategists neither wanted, nor attempted, to understand Ukrainian 
movements for independence. They viewed Ukraine negatively through the pnsm of 
“suicidal nationalism,” and considered it a country that could endanger the whole nuclear 
disarmament process, and hence global and regional security. 
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Despite this stance, the United States eventually recognized the independence of 
Ukraine on 25 December 1991. This chapter suggests that several key factors pushed the 
administration of President George Bush to recognize the independence of Ukraine. 
Among them are the following: the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory, the 
American-Ukrainian diaspora pressure on the administration, the Ukrainian referendum 
of 1 December 1991, the inability of Gorbachev and Yeltsin to get control over Ukraine 
and preserve a union, and the growing recognition accorded to Ukraine by countries 
around the world. It was a great reversal of the twentieth-century American approach 
which had attempted to preserve the unity of a Moscow-directed empire at the expense of 
the Ukrainian people’s struggle for independence. 
The United States’ reluctant recognition of Ukrainian independence, however, did 
not represent a fundamental change in U.S. policy toward the region. It continued to be 
characterized by a “Russia only” approach, which viewed Russia positively and Ukraine 
negatively. 
In contrast with its attitude to Ukraine, the United States viewed Russia as a 
“trustworthy” country that was moving toward democracy and that needed international 
economic assistance in that transition. Washington policy makers continued to entertain 
the possibility of Russia founding a new union or a confederation in the framework of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
U S .  relations with Ukraine were conditioned on nuclear disarmament. In 
addition, the United States coordinated an anti-Ukrainian campaign with its Western 
allies, which isolated Kyiv economically from the West. Some Russians interpreted this 
campaign as a signal of support to Russia for its “near abroad ” policy toward newly 
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independent states in exchange for Russian central control over nuclear weapons. In fact, 
the Bush Administration accepted Russia’s sphere of influence over the former Soviet 
republics. 
A. THE FIRST PERIOD 
The United States viewed the possibility of Ukrainian independence negatively 
because it wanted to preserve the Soviet Union, out of a fear that the Yugoslav scenario 
would repeat itself in the case of a violent collapse of the USSR and that central control 
over nuclear weapons would be lost. 
The strategic assumptions during the Bush Administration’s initial period 
regarding the USSR were the following. 
Initially, American strategists assumed that the Soviet Union would remain stable 
for the foreseeable future. For example, the Atlantic Council of the United States’ 
Working Group on Strategic Stability, co-chaired by Brent Scowcroft and R. James 
Woolsey, in cooperation with its other working groups on U.S.-Soviet relations, wrote 
that “By the year 2000, the two nations will still be the world’s only superpowers. Their 
ideologies and political and economic systems will remain radically different and in 
competition. Neither side will ‘collapse’ nor fail to maintain strong and effective 
defenses. Rival alliances will remain intact.”36 
Goodpaster, Andrew J., Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., and Robert Kennedy. U S .  Policy toward the 




This assumption of Soviet stability led the United States to treat the USSR as the 
main interlocutor in the region on arms control and human rights cooperation. As the 
Atlantic Council group noted: 
The United States must continue to seek an active and productive dialogue 
with the Soviet Union.. . . The dialogue must also emphasize America’s 
determination (1) to reduce the risk of war by enhancing our ability to 
maintain a stable environment during crises; (2) to reduce and stabilize 
armament levels through sound and verifiable agreements, and ultimately 
to ease the burdens of military spending; (3) to improve bilateral relations 
on the basis of reciprocity and mutual interests; (4) to manage and resolve 
regional conflicts based on the principles of non-intervention and the self- 
determination of peoples; and (5) to seek improvements in human rights 
and encourage the Soviet Union to recognize the advantages ofjoining us 
in this eff01-t.~’ 
In addition, President Bush and his administration believed that reform of the 
Soviet Union was possible. “Bush believed that Gorbachev could do what he said he 
would do: create a liberal empire. Gorbachev believed that communism could gradually 
be reformed to embrace both democracy in the republics and a strong center that 
controlled it. Vilnius and Riga demonstrated, though, that with reform come raised 
popular expectations, revolt, and the need for harsh measures to reinstate control.”38 
Close interaction with Gorbachev took place at a time when Bush needed to take a 
hard line against communism in order to be elected as the President of the United States 
and yet not damage his relations with the Soviet leader. Bush asked Gorbachev to 
37 Ibid., 34. 
Fink, Susan D., “From ‘Chicken Kiev’ to Ukrainian Recognition: Domestic Politics in U.S. 38 
Foreign Policy toward Ukraine,” Harvurd Ukrainian Studies, Vol. XXI, Number 1 / 2 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University, June 1997), 18. 
“ignore” his hard anti-communist statements during the election campaign, which were 
intended for the U.S. internal agenda.39 
In short, the United States viewed the USSR as a reliable and increasingly 
democratic partner in its foreign policy goals (especially with respect to nuclear 
weapons). 
Gorbachev’s offers of Soviet backing during the Gulf War and his cooperation 
with the START I and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaties were repaid by 
George Bush in several ways. Bush’s repayment included his unconditional support to 
Gorbachev in connection with the “Bloody Sunday” tragedies in Lithuania and Latvia in 
January 199 1, the “Chicken Kiev” speech of August 199 1, anti-Ukrainian diplomatic 
activity among the Western powers and coordination of this activity with the Soviet 
leaders in 1990-1991, attempts to preserve the Soviet Union, and delaying the US.  
recognition of Ukraine until 25 December 1991 .40 
The best illustration of the Bush administration’s approach to Ukraine during this 
period was Bush’s “Chicken Kiev ” speech on 1 August 199 1 , shortly before the 
attempted coup against Gorbachev by Communist party hard-liners. The speech was 
prepared in coordination with Gorbachev and attempted to prevent Ukrainian 
independence. 41 Jack F. Matlock, Jr. has described the coordination between American 
and Soviet officials over Bush’s visit to the Ukrainian capital and has pointed out that 
j9 bid., 16. 
Idid., 16-17, (see also Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: 40 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 223, 512.). 
Matlock, Jack F. Jr.. Autopsy on an Empire: the American Ambassador’s Account of the 41 
Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), 565. 
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“this exchange made Bush and his staff hypercautious to avoid anything that might 
embarrass Gorbachev during the Kiev trip. In fact they began to think of ways it could be 
used to ‘help G ~ r b a c h e v . ’ ” ~ ~  In his speech, President Bush sent a strong message to the 
Ukrainian parliament that the United States would not support independence. 
Bush stated that “Americans will not support those who seek independence in 
order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who 
promote a suicidal nationalism based on ethnic hatred. We will support those who want 
to build demo~racy.’’~~ 
Bush’s speech emphasized that the United States would take Gorbachev’s 
“democratic’’ side and that the Ukrainian “despotic” side would have no choice other than 
to go into Gorbachev’s union. 
Some people have urged the United States to choose between supporting 
President Gorbachev and supporting independence-minded leaders 
throughout the U.S.S.R. I consider this a false choice. ... We will maintain 
the strongest possible relationship with the Soviet Government of 
President Gorbachev. But we also appreciate the new realities of life in the 
U. S. S .R.44 
There is evidence that the Bush administration attempted to coordinate its anti- 
Ukrainian campaign not only with the Soviet government but also with its Western allies. 
America and the West supported Gorbachev and then Yeltsin, reacting negatively to the question 
of Ukrainian independence. Bush’s account of his meeting with FranGois Mittenand on 17 April 
1990 illustrates this point. 
42 Ibid., 565. 
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“We are in a terrible contradiction,” he [Mitterrand] began. “Our interests 
are in keeping Gorbachev where he is, and in supporting Lithuanian 
independence.” Frangois urged that we try to negotiate to give him time to 
introduce changes. “Gorbachev has inherited an empire,” he continued. “It 
is now in revolt. If Ukraine starts to move Gorbachev is gone; a military 
dictatorship would result.. . .” I told Franqois that what worried me was the 
Soviet military reacting on its 
Once the stability of the Soviet Union was called into question, the Bush 
Administration did not have a clear policy. After the August 1991 coup attempt, when 
Ukraine declared its independence from the Soviet Union, key officials of the Bush 
Administration discussed America’s possible strategy on the breakup of the Soviet Union 
and arms control issues. 
“But what should we be doing now to engage Ukraine?” asked Cheney. 
“We are reacting.” Scowcroft observed that Cheney’s premise was that we 
would be dealing with fifteen or sixteen independent countries. “The 
voluntary breakup of the Soviet Union is in our interest,” argued Cheney. 
“If it’s a voluntary association, it will happen. If democracy fails, we’re 
better off if they’re small.. . . The President asked whether we thought 
Ukraine would be in the new Union. “Out,” predicted Cheney. “Should we 
encourage that publicly?” the President asked. Cheney thought 
not.. . .Cheney thought we could do more if we knew that was the direction 
we wanted our policy to take. Powell was less certain. “We want to see the 
dissolution of the old Soviet Union,” he said. “I am not sure that means 
fifteen republics walking around. Some confederation is in our interest as 
well as seeking out bilateral  relationship^."^^ 
According to American experts regarding U.S. policy-making at this time, the 
overall view of Ukraine was extremely negative. Ukraine was viewed through the prism 
of extreme nationalism and anti-Semitism, and compared to Milosevic’s Serbia. It was 
Bush quoted in Fink, Susan D, From “Chicken Kiev” to Ukrainian Recognition: Domestic 44 
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assumed that Ukrainian independence would lead to a Yugoslav-style scenario on a 
gigantic scale. The Bush position on Ukraine during the summer of 1991 was that the 
Soviet Union would never let Ukraine go and that Moscow would manage this question 
by force, if ne~essary.~’ In addition, as Susan Fink has observed, Americans generally 
misunderstood nationalism. In this regard, she has quoted George Kennan, the father of 
America’s Soviet “containment” policy, who believed that nationalism was “a terrible 
disease of the human spirit.” Furthermore, she has argued, “the misunderstanding of 
nationalism helps to explain U.S. condemnation of democratic movements in Ukraine 
and other non-Russian republics in order to maintain good relations with the 
communists.9748 
In addition, as other U.S. experts have pointed out, it was obvious that Ukrainian 
independence was irreversible after the August 1991 attempted coup in Moscow. 
However, Washington did not want to accept it. The Americans were comfortable with 
the existence of the USSR, and in particular with the guarantees that had been worked out 
with respect to nuclear and biological weapons.“’ 
This U.S. strategic approach supported Gorbachev in his attempts to reform the 
Soviet Union and resisted Ukrainian independence until the very end. On the same day 
Gorbachev resigned (25 December 1991) the Bush administration finally recognized 
Ukraine. The fate of Ukraine was thus linked to the fate of the last Moscow-based 
Author’s interviews in Washington D.C., February 22-25 and March 1-3,2000. 
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emperor. Even when it was obvious that the United States had to recognize Ukraine, the 
approach of the Bush Administration was, in the words of one American expert, “to 
recognize, but not to establish diplomatic  relation^."^' 




3 .  
4. 
5.  
The nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory. 
The pressure from the American-Ukrainian diaspora. 
The inability of Gorbachev and Yeltsin to get control over Ukraine during the 
collapse of the USSR, which led to Gorbachev’s resignation. 
The recognition of Ukraine by an increasing number of other countries. 
The Ukrainian referendum of 1 December 1991. 
The nuclear factor played one of the key roles in U.S. recognition of Ukraine. 
During the first period, it was one of the main obstacles to U.S. recognition of Ukrainian 
independence . 
The strategic assumption in this case was very simple. The USSR was the only 
power in the world that could destroy the United States. Relations between Washington 
and Moscow had been built on this strategic assumption for decades. Negotiations on 
nuclear disarmament had continued for years and had resulted in the START I treaty of 
1991. U.S. defense and security elites were experts in nuclear weapons and deterrence, 
but they did not know how to deal with the emerging nationalism in the region and new 
potential “nuclear” negotiators. 
50 bid .  
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The American point of view on U.S.-Ukrainian nuclear disarmament negotiations 
has been well described by Roman Popadiuk, Alexander J. Motyl, Sherman Garnett, 
Nadia Schadlow, and many other  expert^.^' With all due respect to American views on 
this history, Ukrainian views differ on several significant points. 
This thesis argues that the nuclear factor prevented pro-Moscow American 
strategists from rejecting Ukrainian independence for the third time during the twentieth 
century. The nuclear factor gave Ukrainian elites the opportunity to re-educate American 
security and defense elites with regard to Ukraine and helped the young state to survive 
despite Washington’s “Russia first” policy. It helped Kyiv buy time and got Kyiv 
involved in high level diplomatic activity. Finally, nuclear disarmament and Ukraine’s 
pro-Westem political orientation helped to demonstrate the difference between Ukraine 
and Russia in foreign and security policy. 
As Roman Popadiuk, the first American Ambassador to Ukraine, has stated, 
For the United States, the nuclear issue had global and regional, as well as 
bilateral significance.. . . There was also a geostrategic concern on the part 
of the United States. With so many weapons scattered throughout the four 
former republics, it was feared that they could become easy targets for 
acquisition by terrorists.. . . There was also concern that Ukraine’s failure 
to fulfill its promises could unravel the whole START Treaty as well as 
endanger the START I1 Treaty, which was eventually signed with Russia 
in January, 1993.. .. It was also feared that Ukraine’s reluctance could set 
the precedent for increased nuclear proliferation and could have 
jeopardized the NPT regime which was due for review in 1995. But above 
See Popadiuk, Roman. American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations. McNair Paper 55 .  Washington, 51 
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all, Washington believed that Ukraine’s retention of nuclear weapons 
ironically endangered Ukraine’s own long term security and stability, 
rather than enhancing it.52 
Ukraine was ultimately able to deal with these concerns. The possibility of 
Ukraine becoming a nuclear power challenged the whole system of regional, European, 
and global affairs. Ukraine possessed the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world, after 
the United States and Russia. Automatically, the question of Ukrainian nuclear 
disarmament held multidimensional significance: for U.S.-Russian nuclear disarmament 
in the framework of START I and START 11; for Russian-Ukrainian relations; for the 
nuclear potential of Ukraine in relation to Britain, France and China; for the survivability 
of the NPT regime; for the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; for 
relations with Central European neighbors, etc. Thus, Ukrainian nuclear weapons were 
priority number one for the Bush administration and influenced its view on the 
recognition o f ~ k r a i n e . ~ ~  
The administration stated five conditions which needed to be satisfied before the 
United States would recognize the independence of Ukraine: 
The ‘five principles’ were not unlike those we had devised on German 
reunification: self-determination through democratic methods; respect for 
existing borders, with any changes made through negotiation; respect for 
democracy and the rule of law; human rights; and adherence to 
international law and the USSR’s existing treaty obligations. To these we 
later added a sixth-central control over nuclear weapons, and safeguards 
against internal or external proliferation. These principles 
notwithstanding, however, we never really drafted a tight administration 
policy on the potential breakup of the Union. 54 
s2 Popadiuk, Roman. American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations. McNair Paper 5 5 .  (Washington, 
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The second most powerful factor that contributed to the U.S. recognition was the 
Ukrainian diaspora in the United States. At the time of its declaration of independence, 
Ukraine did not have specialists who deeply understood the specifics of Washington’s 
policy nor did it have connections in Washington capable of influencing American policy 
on the Ukrainian issue. However, the American-Ukrainian diaspora helped the Ukrainian 
movement for independence become a powerful force by supplying advice, resources, 
and support. The diaspora organized the visits of prominent Ukrainian leaders to 
Washington and other American cities to meet with key officials in the Bush 
Administration and the U.S. Congress. With the diaspora activity, the U.S. Congress 
became the most powerful factor in US.-Ukrainian relations and provided a balance to 
the administration’s fixation on Russia. 
As Susan Fink has pointed out, Ronald Reagan’s support enabled the American- 
Ukrainian diaspora to become a powerful force in the domestic political process; and this 
diaspora later became one of the most powerful challenges to Bush’s pro-Gorbachev 
political course.55 
To illustrate the contribution of the U.S.-Ukrainian community to U.S. policy, this 
thesis uses the example of Ukraine 2000 and its director, Robert A. McConnell, a former 
Reagan Administration Assistant Attorney General. McConnell knew President Bush and 
Secretary of State James Baker personally and had powerful connections in the 
Fink, Susan D. From “Chicken Kiev” to Ukrainian Recognition: Domestic.Politics in U.S. 55 
Foreign Policy toward Ukraine. Haward Ukrainian Studies. Vol. XXI, Number 1 I2 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University, June 1997), 16. 
36 
admini~tration.~~ He helped organize the visit to Washington in September 1990 by 
Mykhailo Horyn, a prominent Ukrainian leader for independence, and set up his meetings 
with top members of the administration, even though Gorbachev and Shevarnadze urged 
the administration to avoid high level meetings with him. McConnell organized meetings 
for Horyn with five cabinet members, including Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. 
According to Susan Fink, 
After the 1990 meeting, Ukrainian-Americans noticed a change in the 
Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) position on Ukraine. The DOD seemed 
more attentive to the strategic importance of Ukraine, as well as to matters 
of financial aid and assistance. Thus, DOD’s stand was similar to that of 
Congress: supporting the pro-democratic movement in Ukraine was the 
only way to ensure good relations with what could emerge as the second 
largest state in E ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~  
In cooperation with American-Ukrainians, Robert McConnell organized an 
unprecedented visit of Ukrainian parliamentarians-leaders who later played a significant 
role in independence-to the United States for the “Conference on the American system 
of governance for Ukrainian legislators” in April 199 1, when Ukraine was not yet an 
independent state. The participation from the American side and the program of meetings 
with top American officials in the administration and the U.S. Congress were 
Author’s interviews in Washington D.C., February 22-25, March 1-3, 2000. 56 
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Furthermore, McConnell was present at the meeting of President Bush with 
fifteen American-Ukrainian leaders in the White House in November 199 1. During this 
meeting President Bush announced the five conditions for Ukrainian recognition. 
McConnell immediately informed the Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament in Kyiv 
about the five conditions by e-mail. This frustrated the State Department’s attempt to 
articulate additional conditions beyond those stated’ by President 
McConnell organized the visit of the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Konstantyn 
Morozov, to Washington before the Russian Minister of Defense’s visit. In addition, 
Robert McConnell organized President Kravchuk’s visit to Camp David-an event with 
powerful symbolic value in bilateral relations. Finally, for two years the Director of 
Ukraine 2000 daily advised through e-mail the Ukrainian government about what should 
be done to improve U.S.-Ukrainian relations. This is only one example of the role of the 
American-Ukrainian diaspora in U.S.-Ukrainian relations. Other Ukrainian-Americans, 
such as Lev Dobriansky, Nadia McConnell, the Chopivski family, Paula Dobriansky, 
Orest Deichakivski, and Nadia Diuk, also played an important role. 
Also, 
American-Ukrainian activities thus became one of the most powerhl factors 
contributing to the recognition of Ukrainian independence. As Susan Fink has pointed 
out, “The meeting with President Bush was the culmination of all these efforts. First, it 
showed that the administration recognized the lobby as a consideration in policy making. 
Second, coming on the heels of Senate Concurrent Resolution 65, it indicated the 
Congress-lobby solidarity against the Bush stand towards Ukrainian independence. 
” Author’s interviews in Washington D.C., February 22-25 and March 1-3, 2000. 
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Finally, the meeting brought together members of otherwise fractious components of the 
lobby under one banner-diplomatic recognition.”60 
The third factor was the inability of Gorbachev and Yeltsin to persuade the 
Ukrainian leadership to join the union or to get control over Ukraine militarily. The 
Ukrainian movement for independence, the failure of the Moscow coup, Ukraine’s 
formal declaration of independence, the Ukrainian parliament’s decision to create its own 
armed forces, and the strong position of the Ukrainian leadership at the Bison Forest 
meeting which contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union and to the “peaceful 
divorce.” 
The fourth factor, growing relations between Ukraine and other countries, has 
been described by the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Borys Tarasyuk. According 
to the Minister, “Ukraine’s foreign policy began immediately after the adoption of state 
sovereignty on 16 July 1 990.7’61 Among the achievements of Ukrainian diplomacy prior 
to U.S. recognition were activity in the United Nations and the establishment of bilateral 
relations with Hungary, Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Belarus and others. With some of 
these countries important agreements were concluded to recognize the existing borders 
and the rights of national minorities. U.S. strategists could not disregard this factor. 
The importance of the fifth factor, the 1 December 1991 referendum, has been 
underlined by almost all US.  experts. In this referendum more than 90 percent of the 
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Ukrainian voters approved the country’s declaration of independence. The results of the 
referendum enabled to the first Ukrainian President, Leonid Kravchuk, to take a strong 
position at the meeting in Bison Forest on 7 December 1991 and refuse to joint a 
Moscow-controlled Union. It showed the world the high level of popular support for 
Ukrainian independence and satisfied some of the five conditions the Bush 
Administration had set for recognition. 
After the U.S. recognition of Ukrainian independence on 25 December 1991, the 
Bush Administration continued to pay primary attention to Moscow and placed heavy 
conditions on the Ukrainian state to control its nuclear arsenal. This period became the 
most controversial in U.S.-Ukrainian relations. 
B. THE SECOND PERIOD 
The second period, from December 1991 to November 1992, was characterized 
by the overriding U.S. concern with Ukraine’s possession of nuclear weapons. From 
December 1991 to April 1992 this concern led the United States to continue with its 
“Russia only” approach and to negotiate only with Russia over the control of nuclear 
weapons on Ukrainian soil. Only when this strategy had failed did the US. begin to treat 
Ukraine as a partner at the negotiating table. Even then, however, U.S.-Ukrainian 
relations were restricted to the very narrow agenda of nuclear weapons. Following the 
Bush-Gorbachev traditions, the American strategists emphasized the central role of 
Moscow in the post-Soviet space and attached importance to the possibility of a new 
union in the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The tradition 
of viewing Ukraine through the potential for instability and nationalism began with 
Bush’s “Chicken Kiev” speech and continued during this period, which was dominated 
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by the nuclear issue. Nuclear disarmament was the central question in U.S.-Ukraine 
relations. The fulfilling of the commitments on Ukrainian nuclear disarmament became 
the main condition in bilateral relations with regard to U.S. economic assistance. The 
strategic assumption that it was Russia’s business to deal with the other former Soviet 
republics over nuclear issues and that it would regain control over the nuclear weapons 
on Ukrainian territory failed, and this led to the Lisbon Protocol that made Ukraine a 
party to the START I treaty. 
Bush gave unconditional support to Moscow and favored Russian plans to 
organize a new union. The resignation of Gorbachev and the Bush Administration’s 
reluctant recognition of Ukraine’s independence did not lead to a significant change in 
the U.S. decision to emphasize its relations with Russia and to neglect its relations with 
Ukraine. Before his resignation on 25 December 1991, Gorbachev in his final telephone 
call to President Bush suggested two key approaches to the President of the United States 
with regard to Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS). He emphasized the 
necessity of American support to Russia’s effort to organize a possible new union on the 
basis of the CIS: 
“George, let me say something to you that I regard as very important. Of 
course, it is necessary to move to recognize all of these countries. But I 
would like you to bear in mind the importance for the future of the 
Commonwealth that the process of disintegration does not grow worse. 
So, helping the process of cooperation among the republics is our common 
duty .... Again, about Russia, let me say we should all do our best to 
support it. I will do this to support Russia. But our partners should do this 
too and should play a role to help and support it.”62 
Gorbachev quoted in Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft., A World Transformed (New York: 
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The last Moscow-based emperor still hoped that Russia could be the center of a 
new Russian-dominated union. In addition, Jack Matlock has characterized the relations 
between Russia and the West as a honeymoon during this period. 
Russia’s honeymoon with the West lasted through 1992, when a second 
agreement to reduce strategic arms was negotiated with the United States, 
votes in the U.N. Security Council were in harmony with the Western 
Powers, and international lending organizations made large, though 
conditional, commitments for financial and economic assistance to 
Russia.63 
Moreover, the United States designated Russia as the guarantor of nuclear 
weapons in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and the primary negotiator for nuclear 
disarmament. In fact, the West, viewing Russia as-at least in some respects-the only 
successor of the USSR, ignored agreements in the framework of the CIS which 
recognized the equality of all successor states. 
This thesis argues that the “Russia only” approach of the United States and the 
West, particularly during the period from December 1991 to November 1992, pushed 
Russia toward the policy of political, economic, and military interference in the internal 
affairs of the other former Soviet republics. The Russian policy of direct and indirect 
involvement in the conflicts in Georgia, Moldova, Nagorno-Karabach and Tajikistan; 
Russian temtorial claims; and Russian speculation about the rights of Russian-speaking 
minorities in the other former Soviet republics raised questions about the security and 
survivability of the other post-Soviet republics. This affected the nuclear disarmament 
issues because nuclear weapons became the most effective tool to convince the West to 
pay attention to Russia and the other former Soviet republics. 
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In contrast with the policy on Russia, American strategic approaches to Ukraine 
remained negative during this period. As Nadia Schadlow has pointed out in reference to 
Bush’s “Chicken Kiev” speech of 1 August 1991, “this speech established a legacy of 
mistrust that was difficult to undo over the next year.”64 U.S. officials continued to view 
Ukraine though the prism of nuclear di~armament .~~ 
On a strategic level two competing policy approaches were represented by 
Secretary of State James Baker and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. Baker 
defended an approach calling for nuclear disarmament first, and pursuing other matters 
second. According to Nadia Schadlow, 
Department of Defense officials, supported by Secretary Cheney, argued 
that the denuclearization of Ukraine, while important, should not be 
Washington’s paramount goal: more important were Ukraine’s ultimate 
independence and the need to develop a full spectrum of contacts with the 
new state. From the fall of 1991 through the spring of 1992, Secretaries 
Cheney and Baker discussed these issues often, with Cheney pressing for a 
broader agenda with Ukraine.66 
Secretary of State Baker’s position was reinforced by the narrow expertise of the 
U.S. community of strategic and arms control analysts and practitioners: 
this group knew a great deal about nuclear weapons and little about 
Ukraine.’By and large this group expected Ukraine to try to keep its 
weapons and tended to see many Ukrainian political and defense steps 
solely through the prism of nuclear policy. As a result, the U.S. 
government often looked at the nuclear problem as a matter that should 
and could be separated from nation building and the formation of relations 
between these new states. In retrospect it is clear that neither Ukraine nor 
~~ 
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Russia treated the nuclear question as an autonomous issue, but rather as 
part of whole package of issues from debt relief to the division of the 
Black Sea Fleet that defined Russian-Ukrainian relations.67 
American policies regarding Ukraine were also affected by various analyses that 
predicted that Ukraine would not survive.68 
The early history of the U.S.-Ukrainian nuclear relationship showed that the 
American “Russia only” approach in nuclear disarmament did not work. The Bush 
Administration approach consisted of unconditional support to Gorbachev and later 
Yeltsin and a disregard for the security interests of the other newly independent states. 
This approach endangered the process of nuclear disarmament and the survivability of the 
non-Russian newly independent states, and it gave Russia a misleading signal about its 
“near abroad ” policy. Nuclear bargaining and diplomacy became the only possible 
response of the states that had inherited nuclear weapons from the USSR and that were 
facing enormous pressure from Russia. Moscow linked nuclear disarmament with other 
Russian demands that produced serious problems, including Russian interference in the 
internal affairs of the other former Soviet republics. As a result, Ukraine linked its 
nuclear commitments to the resolution of its problems with Russia. 
Nuclear issues became the means of deepening the involvement of the Western 
powers in the former Soviet space and broadening bilateral relations between Ukraine 
and the West. 
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US. engagement made a significant difference. Without it, the most likely 
outcome would have been not Ukraine’s seizure of the weapons-such a 
move would have been too destabilizing internally-but a long stalemate 
in Russian-Ukrainian talks that would have brought the nuclear systems 
increasingly under defacto Ukrainian control.69 
Russia’s inability to conclude an agreement with Ukraine about nuclear 
disarmament required U.S. engagement in this process. As the first American 
Ambassador to Ukraine, Roman Popadiuk, observed: 
The United States had sought to keep the strategic nuclear weapons under 
MOSCOW’S control, thus making Russia responsible for dealing with the 
other three nuclear republics in dismantling the missiles much as they had 
arrived at a formula for the tactical weapons. By April, 1992, it had 
become obvious that this plan would not work, as Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan, unable to work out their differences with Russia at CIS 
summits, began to insist on equal treatment with Russia. The growing 
conflict over the nuclear weapons had been magnified by Ukraine’s 
aforementioned temporary stoppage of tactical shipments to Russia in 
March [ 19921 .’O
These factors led to the Lisbon Protocol in May 1992. Roman Popadiuk has 
described the importance of the Lisbon Protocol as follows: “The United States, 
therefore, proposed making the former republics a party to START, but with their 
commitments to join the NPT regime and become non-nuclear states. For Ukraine, this 
was an important step for separating itself from Russia and positioning itself as an 
independent country that should not be viewed through a Moscow prism.”71 
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The protocol signed by the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs in Lisbon made 
Ukraine an equal partner in the nuclear disarmament process, but it did not change any 
other aspect of U.S.-Ukrainian relations. Conditions related to nuclear weapons continued 
to be applied to relations on a bilateral (U.S.-Ukraine) and multilateral basis (the Western 
powers and Ukraine). Russia continued to be the top priority for American and other 
Western assistance. In October 1992, the Bush administration aimed at persuading Kyiv 
to ratify the START I treaty and accede to the NPT. This attempt failed because it 
followed the same strategic approach-attaching conditions to improvements in bilateral 
relations while neglecting Ukraine’s complex situation. 
The only new factor that played a key role in changing the U.S. strategic approach 
to Ukraine was the involvement of the U.S. Congress in the nuclear disarmament process. 
Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar in December 1992 urged administration officials 
to recognize the necessity to “stay in constant communication” with the newly 
independent states and to “focus their energies on the Former Soviet Union.”72 The 
involvement of the US.  Congress in the nuclear disarmament process made the 
administration’s pursuit of a “Russia only” policy much harder. Moreover, it provided an 
opportunity to consider “the Ukrainian question” in a more comprehensive way. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
The Bush Administration held that it was the responsibility of Gorbachev and 
Yeltsin to decide what to do about the “suicidal nationalism” of Ukraine in exchange for 
U.S. support for Moscow retaining central control over the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian 
’l hid., 22. 
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territory and continuing nuclear disarmament in the framework of START I and START 
11. From the point of view of U.S.-Russia-Ukraine relations, the U.S. approach favored 
Moscow at the expense of Kyiv. The recognition of Ukrainian independence was for the 
Bush Administration more a strategic necessity than an act of political will to support the 
independence of the newly independent states. 
In summary, the Bush Administration’s approach toward Ukrainian independence 
was limited by the “nuclear question,” which became the overriding condition for 
possible future development of bilateral relations. According to Sherman Garnett, 
In private, they feared-and exaggerated-what President Bush expressed 
publicly during his August 1991 visit to Kiev on the very eve of Ukrainian 
independence: the dangers of “suicidal nationalism.” Formal U.S. 
recognition of Ukrainian independence, when it came in December 1991 
was conditioned on fulfillment of Ukraine’s pledge to become a non- 
nuclear state.73 
The Bush administration viewed with suspicion any attempt by Ukraine to 
broaden the agenda of bilateral relations via “nuclear bargaining diplomacy.” It would 
not be until well into the Clinton Administration that this U.S. policy would change. 
Sherman W. Garnett, Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of 7: 
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V. STRATEGIC APPROACHES OF THE FIRST CLINTON ADMINISTRATION 
(1 993-1 997) 
The Clinton Administration’s approach in 1993-1997 can be divided into two 
major periods: “after nuclear disarmament, Ukraine is important” (1 993- 1995) and 
“Ukraine as a strategic partner” (1 995- 1997). 
The first period can be defined as a continuation of the principles of the Bush 
administration policy: “Russia first” and “first nuclear disarmament and then bilateral 
relations.” From the point of view of US-Russia-Ukraine relations, the United States 
still focused on Moscow at the expense of Ukraine, but with a growing vision of post- 
Cold War problems with Russia and the importance of cooperative relations with 
Ukraine. 
The second period has been called a period of idealization of Ukraine by today’s 
American strategists because of high expectations about the country’s economic reforms 
and its cooperation with NATO (the belief that Ukraine was another Poland). It was a 
golden period in foreign, security, and defense relations between Ukraine and the West. 
Ukrainian nuclear disarmament as well as Russia’s resistance to NATO enlargement and 
Russia’s transfers of technologies to China contributed to the Western shift toward Kyiv. 
The United States and other Western countries recognized the strategic importance of 
Ukraine and its contribution to European security, but economic support was not 
significant during these years. 
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A. NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT APPROACH, 1993-1995 
The framework defining U.S. interests regarding Ukraine at the beginning of the 
Clinton administration was expressed in the statement of Walter Slocombe, the Principal 
Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, Department of Defense, during the U.S. Senate 
Hearing about U.S. Policy on Ukrainian Security in June 1993. Slocombe said, 
The United States has important interests in this region. In discussing 
these interests, these objectives are of overwhelming importance to the 
United States: (1) the success of President Yeltsin’s reforms in Russia and 
(2) the denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and the 
reduction, in parallel with our own START reductions, and (3) the 
reduction of Russian nuclear forces to START I1 levels. 
In short, the American policy was mainly focused on reforms in Russia, 
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denuclearization of Ukraine and others, and continuation of nuclear disarmament. The 
policy toward Ukraine was subordinated to the policy toward Russia; and this solidified 
the traditional U.S. approach toward Ukraine. Support to democratic reforms in Ukraine 
was not a priority for the administration. 
During these years, American policymakers continued to view Ukraine negatively 
through the prism of possible proliferation and conflict with Russia. Steven Woehrel, an 
analyst of European affairs at the Congressional Research Service, reached researched the 
following conclusions about U.S. interests with regard to the nuclear weapons on 
Ukrainian temtory: 
One key concern of the United States is the fact that the 176 ICBMs on 
Ukrainian soil were designed to hit targets in the United States. 
Prepared Statement of Walter Slocombe in U.S. Policy on Ukrainian Security. Hearing before 74 
the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One 
Hundred Third Congress, first session, 24 June 1993, 13. 
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Another set of concerns deals with arms control, particularly with the 
implementation of START I and START I1 Treaties, and safeguarding the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime and the NPT of 1968. 
Another key proliferation concern is that nuclear warheads or nuclear 
weapons technology could be transferred from Ukraine to countries hostile 
to the United States, such as Iran, Iraq or North Korea. 
Another U.S. concern is the impact of the nuclear issue on Russian- 
Ukrainian relations. President Yeltsin and Russian military leaders charge 
that Ukraine is deceiving the international community about its intentions 
concerning the weapons on its soil and suspect Ukraine is planning to 
seize control of them and aim them against Russia. 
Another interest involves the stability of Ukraine. Press reports cite a 
January 1994 CIA intelligence estimate that the catastrophic state of 
Ukraine’s economy could ignite regional and ethnic tensions that would 
cause the country’s violent breakup.” 
Media reports reinforced these fears about the intentions of Ukrainian leaders and 
the country’s stability. As former Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States Yuri 
Scherbak pointed out, 
In 1992-1993 the U.S. media published a series of biased and blatantly 
anti-Ukrainian articles, often inspired by foreign propaganda centers 
whose purpose was to discredit Ukraine. These articles treated Ukraine 
with scorn and did not try to disguise their rejection of the very idea of an 
independent Ukraine.. . . I would only like to mention that up to mid-1 993 
Washington assumed a tough, almost ultimatum-like position towards 
Ukraine. The U.S. refused to conduct a dialogue on the basis of equality or 
to develop economic cooperation until Ukraine would ratify the START-I 
and join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).76 
This ultimatum policy of the new administration raised opposition in Ukraine to 
the speed of the nuclear disarmament process. Nadia Schadlow has described the 
response of the Ukrainian parliament as follows: 
Woehrel, Steven, Ukraine: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. Interests., CRS Report for Congress 75 
(Washington D.C.: The Library of Congress, 15 March 1994). 
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In April 1993 a block of 162 parliamentarians drafted an open letter 
demanding that Ukraine remain a nuclear state until key compensation 
issues were resolved. The letter caused much concern throughout the U.S. 
government and acted as a strong impetus to the Clinton administration’s 
determination to broaden U.S. strategy toward Ukraine. The fate of the 
weapons was clearly linked to Ukraine’s acute economic decline, its 
increasingly acrimonious relations with Moscow, and internal political 
discord. It became apparent that Washington’s sustained involvement in 
Ukrainian economic and security issues would be a prerequisite for 
removal of the weapons. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s and 
Ambassador at Large Strobe Talbott’s visits to Kyiv in May and June 
[ 19931 finally established this broader approach.77 
After it became evident that the administration’s “stick approach” was not 
working and that Washington would not succeed in bringing about Ukrainian nuclear 
disarmament through its policy of pressure, it started to review its approach. According to 
Ambassador at Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the 
Clinton Administration reviewed its policy regarding Ukraine in the middle of 1993: 
After the Vancouver summit, the Clinton administration launched a 
comprehensive interagency review that sought to refine and broaden U.S. 
policy toward Ukraine. Secretary Aspin’s recent visit, as well as my own 
earlier trip to Kiev, followed directly from that policy review. These visits 
are part of a larger strategy of engaging the senior Ukrainian leadership in 
an effort to turn a new page in relations with Kiev. We have made it clear 
to our Ukrainian friends that we seek a broader, deeper, and richer 
relationship, a multidimensional relationship that takes account of our 
mutual economic, political, and security interests. 78 
76 Shcherbak, Yuri, The Strategic Role of Ukraine: Diplomatic Addresses and Lectures (1994- 
1997) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 1998), 58. 
Nadia Schadlow in Ukraine in the World. Ed. Lubomyr A. Hajda, Haward Ukrainian Studies, 17 
Vol. XX (1996) Special issue (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard 
University, 1996), 278. 
’‘ See statement of Strobe Talbott in U.S. Policy on Ukrainian Security. Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One 
Hundred Third Congress, first session, 24 June 1993: 4. 
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The new trading point was the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine in exchange for 
U.S. economic assistance and involvement in Ukraine’s security arrangements. 
This shift in emphasis created a wider bilateral framework. As Slocombe 
concluded, “The recognition of our interests in an independent Ukraine, together with our 
interests in the success of reform in Russia and implementation of the START Treaties, 
form the basis of our approach toward obtaining Ukrainian ratification and 
implementation of its obligations under the Lisbon Profoc01.’’~~ As a result, for the first 
time the Clinton administration moved a bit forward from its “Russia only” approach to a 
“Ukraine as well” policy. In the practical sphere it meant that the new policy toward 
Ukraine was based on five principles, which Talbott described as follows: 
As a large and resource-rich country in the center of Europe, Ukraine has a 
crucial role to play in the security of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Ukrainian independence and sovereignty are important to the national 
interest of the United States; we want to see the young Ukrainian state 
prosper. 
Our relationship with Ukraine is independent of our relationship with 
Russia; strong relationships with both countries are in our national 
interest, as are good relations between Russia and Ukraine. 
Ukraine, given its history and geography, has legitimate security 
concerns. These can be addressed through a web of bilateral and 
multilateral ties that will help underpin Ukraine’s continued 
independence and sovereignty and its place in the European security 
order. 
We believe it is in Ukraine’s own security interests to fulfill its Lisbon 
Protocol commitments by ratifying START I and acceding to the NPT. 
80 
Ibid., 14. 
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Even though Washington had started to shift to a more comprehensive view of 
Ukraine, with broadening contacts and assistance for disarmament, the overall approach 
did not change in principle-Russia remained the first priority and Ukraine’s positive 
image was linked to the speed of its nuclear disarmament. The main difference in the 
new approach was “not only stick, but also carrot.” According to Garnett, the U.S. 
interagency review process in early 1993 was mainly focused on the nuclear issue. 
No one in the U.S. government questioned the basic nuclear elements of 
the policy, and no serious player-in fact, no player at all-advocated 
tolerance for a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent. The nuclear elements of the 
policy remained: to continue to press Ukraine to fulfill its obligations and 
to provide financial assistance for this purpose. Differences in views did 
emerge, however, over whether the key to Ukrainian compliance was to 
expand the U.S. policy of engagement or to tighten the screw still hrther. 
The review ended with a decision to engage Ukraine in a broad discussion 
of improved economic, political and security ties, implementation of 
which would be linked to the resolution of the nuclear issue.” 
B. FAILURE OF THE FIRST APPROACH 
The Clinton’s Administration’s exclusive focus on Moscow, viewing it as the 
successor state of the USSR responsible for nuclear weapons in the other former Soviet 
republics, began to produce negative results in relations between Russia and these newly 
independent states, and automatically influenced the nuclear issue. 
Throughout 1993 tensions between Russia and Ukraine were high. The 
Massandra summit in September revealed disturbing implications for 
Ukraine, namely that bilateral resolution of important issues like the Black 
Sea Fleet and compensation for the warheads would be very difficult to 
achieve. Furthermore, tensions over Crimea were constant, with Russian 
Duma deputies publicly questioning the status of Sevastopol and even 
~ 
Sherman W. Garnett, Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of 
Central and Eastern Europe (Washington. D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1997), 118- 
119. 
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asserting Russian ownership of the city. In addition, Moscow was issuing 
statements about its determination to protect Russians living abroad.82 
Sherman Gamett has analyzed how Russia, mixing the nuclear issue with its 
policy objectives regarding Ukraine, tried to exploit Ukraine’s internal and external 
weaknesses. “At this meeting [in Massandra, Crimea], Russian leaders exerted 
considerable pressure on President Kravchuk to agree to a comprehensive deal on the 
Black Sea Fleet, nuclear disarmament, and debt relief. The centerpiece of this Russian 
package was a swap of at least partial debt forgiveness for Ukraine’s share of the Black 
Sea Fleet.”83 
It is unclear whether Washington and Moscow coordinated their pressure toward 
Ukraine, but it was obvious that their national interests with regard to Ukraine 
overlapped. The United States wanted the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine; Russia sought 
the same objective, plus control over Ukraine. Both jeopardized Ukraine’s economic 
condition and national security situation. 
As a result of these pressures from both the United States and Russia, Ukraine had 
no choice but to move toward nuclear disarmament. However, Ukraine’s precarious 
economic and national security situation meant that it could not disarm without seeking 
compensation. 
Even the author of this thesis, a strong supporter of a non-nuclear future for 
Ukraine, realized that the Ukrainian side should gain time and attach conditions to its 
82 Nadia Schadlow in Ukraine in the World. Ed. Lubomyr A. Hajda, Haward Ukrainian Studies. 
Vol. XX (1996) Special issue (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard 
University, 1996), 280. 
83 Sherman W. Garnett, Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of 
Central and Eastern Europe (Washington. D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1997), 117. 
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nuclear disarmament. This was apparent during the author’s fellowship on U.S.-Ukraine 
non-proliferation issues at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and during his 
research visit to Washington in April-May 1993. This visit included meetings at the 
National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the 
Department of State, and non-governmental organizations. The U.S. officials and experts 
were not prepared to see Ukraine other than through nuclear lenses. In a June 1993 article 
published in the Ukrainian newspaper, Ukraina Moloda, the author defended the position 
that Ukraine should ratify START I with conditions as the only right scenario for 
Ukraine’s 
Five months later, the Ukrainian leadership took the wisest decision. As a result 
of the dual U.S.-Russian pressure and serious internal economic problems, the Ukrainian 
parliament ratified START I with conditions and demands in November 1993. As 
Sherman Garnett pointed out, “the November ratification became a basis for the January 
1994 Trilateral 
The Trilateral Agreement by the United States, Ukraine and Russia of 14 January 
1994 changed the previous “two against one’’ formula and legitimized direct American 
involvement in Russia-Ukraine issues. As Garnett stated, “This agreement explicitly 
linked Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament to its broader economic and security conditions.. .. 
The significance of the Trilateral Agreement was that it provided a multilateral 
Sharov, Yevhen. Obumovlene Maibutne-NaikraschiiYadernyi Scenarii dlia Ukrainy. Ukraina 84 
Moloda. June 1993. 
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85 
Central and Eastern Europe ( Washington. D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1997), 120. 
framework within which to address nuclear and other issues. It legitimized U.S. interest 
in issues that would ordinarily remain bilateral matters between Moscow and Kiev.”86 
This agreement cosisted of three main elements: a timetable for Ukraine’s nuclear 
disarmament, Russian compensation for the highly enriched uranium (HEU) removed 
from the warheads, and “security assurances for Ukraine that would be provided by the 
U.S., Russia, and the United Kingdom once Ukraine fully acceded to the NPT as a non- 
nuclear state.”s7 For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. 
administration had made a significant shift from its “Russia only” policy. By embracing 
“Ukraine as well,” the United States changed its traditional approach of accepting 
Moscow’s sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. “Thus, the Trilateral agreement 
had forced Russia to concede Washington’s involvement in Moscow’s relations with 
Kyiv. In doing so, Moscow was compelled, through this process, to recognize the 
equality of all the signatories. The agreement stated that each country would deal with 
each other as ‘full and equal  partner^."'^^ 
As a result of the treaty, United States strategists had to think about how to honor 
the security assurances to be given to Ukraine. Even though Washington continued to 
pressure Kyiv about accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty during 1994, the U.S. 
Department of Defense and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense simultaneously developed 
military to military cooperation. 
86 Ibid., 122. 
87 Nadia Schadlow in Ukraine in the World, Ed. Lubomyr A. Hajda, Haward Ukrainian Studies, 
Vol. XX (1996) Special issue (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard 
University, 1996), 281. 
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Throughout these discussions about NPT accession, serious defense and 
military contacts between the United States and Ukraine were taking 
place. Of the former Soviet republics, Ukraine had developed the most 
extensive program of defense contacts. Ukrainian units participated in 
joint exercises with U.S. and NATO troops throughout the 1994-97 
period. And by the end of 1997, the U.S. had given its financial and 
technical support to the creation of a Polish-Ukrainian battali~n.’~ 
Since then, bilateral cooperation in the military sphere and American support to 
Ukraine with regard to the NATO-Ukraine Charter and its implementation have become 
inseparable parts of the U.S.-Ukrainian relationship. 
It should be recognized that Yeltsin’s Russia “contributed” to the magnitude of 
the American defense and security assistance to Ukraine and unwittingly encouraged 
Washington’s shift toward cultivating a strategic partnership with Ukraine. Russia’s 
resistance to NATO enlargement and Russia’s disagreements with the West on policy 
issues affecting the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, and China (among other subjects) and 
other issues postponed the pursuit of the U.S.-Russian strategic arms control agenda that 
has always had vital strategic significance for Washington. 
Although Washington and Moscow maintain areas of mutually beneficial 
co-operation, the spirit of “strategic partnership” of the early 1990s has 
been undermined by increasing tensions and, during NATO’s air strikes 
against Yugoslavia, by a sense of crisis. Besides Kosovo, there are many 
other difficult security issues in U.S.-Russian relations. U.S. efforts to 
persuade Russia that NATO enlargement is not a threat to its interests 
have not been effective. Moscow continues to warn that good relations 
will be undermined if NATO is enlarged and has declared a “red line” 
around other Soviet successor states such as the Baltics and Ukraine, 





Goldman, Stuart D. Russia. Issue Brief for Congress. (Congressional Research Service, 17 90 
August 1999), 11. 
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Stuart D. Goldman, the Congressional Research Service’s expert on Russia, 
identified additional problems in the security sphere between the United States and 
Russia: delays with the ratification of START I1 and problems over the ABM Treaty; 
Russia’s transfer of nuclear reactor and missile technologies to Iran; and Russia’s strong 
opposition to U S .  and British military action against Iraq.” When the U.S.-Russian 
strategic arms control agenda was postponed, issues of regional significance took first 
place. 
I One more fact may help to characterize the changing U.S. approach toward 
I 
I Ukraine. RAND organized two workshops on “Russia, Ukraine and European Security: 
Implications for Western Policy,” held in Ebenhausen, Germany, June 19-2 1 , 1994. ~ 
These workshops, sponsored and supported by the U.S. Air Force as well as other 
defense agencies, included discussions involving key executives, experts and other top 
advisory representatives from the United States, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine. During 
these workshops, possible key scenarios of Western policy toward Ukraine were defined 
as alternatives to American “bilateralism:” 
1. Finlandizhtion. In this scenario, Ukraine would be tied economically and 
politically to the West, but not integrated into Western military structures. This 
scenario would require a very large commitment of Westem resources, which 
the West did not seem ready to make. 
Ukraine ‘Light. ’ In this scenario, Ukraine would be economically but not 
militarily integrated with Russia. This would still require a moderate level of 
Western engagement, but heavier than any that the West has so far indicated 
it is willing to make. 
Ukraine ‘Heavy. ’ In this scenario, Ukraine would be both militarily and 





4. Partition. In this scenario, Ukraine would fragment, with the Eastern part 
joining Russia or a Russian-dominated CIS and Western Ukraine oriented 
toward the West. The West would face the dilemma of how to deal with a 
highly nationalistic Western Ukraine. 
Full Integration. In this scenario, Ukraine would be incorporated into 
Russia or a Russian-dominated CIS.92 
5 .  
It was agreed by the U.S. and German representatives that “The first scenario- 
Finlandization-is probably unrealistic because the West is unwilling to commit the 
resources to achieve it.. . . The second scenario-Ukraine ‘Light ’-probably is the best 
that the West could hope for.”93 There is no direct evidence that this U.S. govemment- 
sponsored project influenced the West’s overall strategy with regard to Ukraine. But it 
may suggest the spectrum of possibilities examined by the Americans and their Western 
allies regarding Ukraine. 
This thesis argues that the “Ukraine ‘Light”’ scenario, the prevention of Ukrainian 
military integration with Russia and economic stabilization mainly based on close 
economic ties with Russia and other CIS states, has characterized U.S.-Ukrainian 
relations since 1994. 
After Ukraine’s accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state on 16 
November 1994, the United States improved the framework of bilateral relations with 
Ukraine, As Garnett has pointed out, in September 1996, “the United States and Ukraine 
agreed to establish a standing governmental commission to advance the bilateral agenda 
Larrabee, F. Stephen and Allen Lynch, Russia, Ukraine and European Security: Implications for 92 
Westem Policy (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), 22-23; emphasis in the original. 
’’ Ibid., 23. 
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in foreign policy, military cooperation, economic reform, and trade and investment; in 
October, the two declared their relationship ‘a strategic partner~hip.”’~~ 
Years of negotiations over nuclear issues and, finally, the nuclear disarmament of 
Ukraine educated both sides and contributed to the changes in American strategic 
approaches to Ukraine. In Garnett’s words, “Ukraine’s now considerable ties with the 
United States remain the bedrock support of Ukraine’s turn to the West. These improved 
relations were slow to come-long stymied by the nuclear question and Washington’s 
initial view that placing Russia first as a strategic priority necessarily meant placing 
Ukraine lower on the list. The resolution of the nuclear question opened the door to an 
expanded U.S. engagement with Ukraine, pursued for its own sake as well as to sustain 
the implementation of the nuclear accords. Ukraine is now the third largest recipient of 
U. S. foreign assistance. ’’95 
The first Clinton Administration’s approaches to Ukraine during the years 1993- 
1997 can thus be divided in two periods. The first period, 1993-1995, continued to follow 
the Bush Administration’s “Russia only’’ approach with a relatively negative view of 
Ukraine. This approach conditioned improvements in U.S.-Ukraine bilateral relations on 
Kyiv’s nuclear disarmament and accorded Russia rights to use any available means 
toward Ukraine. This approach was abandoned when American strategists realized the 
limitations of this policy. 
Sherman W. Garnett. Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of 94 
Central and Eastern Europe (Washmgton. D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), 125- 
126. 
95 Ibid., 126. 
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This thesis argues that the Trilateral Agreement of January 1994 and Ukraine’s 
accession to the NPT, on one hand, and the U.S.-Russian disagreements on security 
matters, on the other, led to the strategic partnership between the United States and 
Ukraine. Russia “contributed” to the deepening of the U.S.-Ukrainian relationship by 
postponing its ratification of START I1 and clashing with the West over international 
security issues. Ukraine was thus able to benefit from political-military cooperation with 
the United States and NATO. 
Even though Ukraine became the third largest recipient of American foreign aid, 
overall the U.S. approaches to Ukraine were limited to the “Ukraine light” scenario. The 
new U.S. policy led to significant U.S.-Ukrainian military cooperation and American 
support to Ukraine in the framework of Ukraine-NATO cooperation, but it did not lead to 
extensive private-sector U.S. financial investments in Ukraine or to large-scale U.S.- 
Ukrainian trade. 
C. STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
The new U.S. approach can be defined as a “strategic pivot” approach with a 
“Ukraine Light” scenario. From the point of view of U.S.-Russia-Ukraine relations, it 
was a more balanced U.S. approach at the expense of Russia. 
This approach was shaped by growing disagreements between Russia and the 
West about NATO enlargement, the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, Kosovo and arms 
transfers to China as well as the American approach toward the use of force in 
international affairs. An influential American strategist and former National Security 
Adviser to the President, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was among the first to recognize the 
significance of Ukraine for U.S. security policy. 
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Although initially the West, especially the United States, had been tardy in 
recognizing the geopolitical importance of a separate Ukrainian state, by 
the mid-1990s both America and Germany had become strong backers of 
Kiev’s separate identity. In July 1996, the U.S. secretary of defense 
declared, “I cannot overestimate the importance of Ukraine as an 
independent country to the security and stability of all of Europe,” while 
in September, the German Chancellor-notwithstanding his strong support 
for President Yeltsin-went even further in declaring that “Ukraine’s firm 
place in Europe can no longer be challenged by anyone.. . No one will be 
able any more to dispute Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity.” 
American policy makers also came to describe the American-Ukrainian 
relationship as “a strategic partnership,” deliberately invoking the same 
phrase used to describe the American-Russian relationship. 
The key element of this approach was a vision of the role of Ukraine in 
96 
constraining Russian strategic options in Europe and in preventing a restoration of 
Russian hegemony over Eurasia. 
Ukraine, a new and important space on the Eurasian chessboard, is a 
geopolitical pivot because its very existence as an independent country 
helps to transform Russia. Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a 
Eurasian empire.. . However, if Moscow regains control over Ukraine, 
with its 52 million people and major resources as well as its access to the 
Black Sea, Russia automatically again regains the wherewithal to become 
a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia. Ukraine’s loss of 
independence would have immediate consequences for Central Europe, 
transforming Poland into the geopolitical pivot on the eastern frontier of a 
united E~rope .~’  
It is hard to prove that official American policy followed Brzezinski’s vision and 
recommendations, but it was obvious that in 1996 and 1997 the role of Ukraine in the 
European balance of power had increased. Since then, Ukraine has become, to use the 
phrases employed by various commentators, “a strategic partner of the USA,” “the key 
European state,” the key of the “European security architecture,” and an “important 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic 96 
Imperatives (New York: BasicBooks, 1997), 113. 
Ibid., 46. 97 
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contributor of stability on the continent.” Furthermore, the EU, NATO, the G-7, the IMF, 
the World Bank and the US.-EU summits put questions about Ukrainian security, 
reforms and stability on their agendas. 
Ukraine opened the possibility for strategic partnership by committing itself to 
Western democratic values and resolving the nuclear issue with the United States. 
The Trilateral Statement on nuclear weapons, and the final removal of 
those weapons in June 1996, removed an important stumbling block in 
US.-Ukrainian relations. In recent years, a consensus appears to have 
emerged, echoed in statements by top US.  policymakers, that a strong, 
multi-faceted relationship with a stable, democratic and independent 
Ukraine is a critical part of U.S. policy toward the region. US. and 
Ukrainian officials have described the bilateral relationship as a “strategic 
partner~hip.”~’ 
This analysis argues that the US.  strategic partnership approach to Ukraine is 
based on the following dimensions: securing and stabilizing the country’s independence, 
supporting its economic reforms, coordinating Western assistance, and supporting 
Ukraine’s integration into transatlantic and European institutions. 
In the sphere of security and stabilization, the United States has helped to promote 
Ukraine’s external security through strengthening the Ukrainian military; Ukraine’s 
integration into European and transatlantic security structures; and US-Ukrainian 
military-technical cooperation and defense industry con~er s ion .~~  
One of the key components of US.  assistance to Kyiv is enhancing relations 
between Ukraine and NATO. The United States strongly supported Ukraine in 
Woehrel, Steven, Ukraine: Current Issues and U S .  Policy (CRS Report for Congress. 8 98 
December 1999), 11. 
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concluding the NATO-Ukraine Charter that created a format of special relations between 
Ukraine and NATO to complement Ukraine’s active participation in NATO’s Partnership 
for Peace program. Furthermore, the Clinton Administration has assured Ukraine that the 
door to NATO is open. In the words of Secretary of State Albright, “We have kept 
NATO open to you.. .What President Clinton and I have said is that NATO is open to all 
democracies and free market economies, and we are also very pleased with the special 
NATO-Ukraine relationship and the ability of your country to begin to work with 
countries in Europe and our own.”’oo 
In addition, since 1996, the United States has encouraged other European states 
and organizations to support Ukraine. For instance, Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher delivered a major speech on European security in Stuttgart in which he said , 
”A critical goal of the New Atlantic Community is to achieve Ukraine’s integration with 
Europe.”lol The United States supported Ukraine’s active participation in (or cooperation 
with) the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
the World Trade Organization, the Central European Free Trade Area, the European 
Union, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
U.S.-Ukraine Security Committee Report, Ref. Number: No.642-96. 15 November 1996; 99 
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The United States added the question of Ukraine to the Transatlantic Agenda of 
the US.-EU Summit in Washington, on December 5, 1997. In the Joint Statement of the 
Summit the United States and the European Union 
affirmed their mutual support for Ukraine's sovereignty and independence 
and their shared desire to help Ukraine achieve its goals of consolidating 
democracy, protecting human rights, reforming the economy and full 
integration into the international community. Ukraine's development as a 
prosperous democracy is a key component of European stability and 
security. '02 
In the sphere of democratization and transition in Ukraine the United States 
supports its economic reforms and stabilization. 
A cornerstone for the continuing U.S. partnership with Ukraine and the 
other NIS has been the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian 
Democracies and Open Markets (FREEDOM) Support Act (FSA), enacted 
in October 1992. Ukraine has been a primary recipient of FSA assistance. 
Total US.  assistance since independence has been over $2 billion. Total 
U.S. assistance in FY 2000 is $216 million, of which $169 million is FSA 
funding. U.S. assistance is targeted to address political and economic 
transformation and humanitarian needs. The US.  has consistently 
encouraged Ukraine's transition to a free, democratic society with a 
prosperous market economy. 103 
The United States also is developing strong technological cooperation in the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy and space research, and supports the accession of Ukraine 
to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 
Ukraine, Joint Statement released in conjunction with the U.S.-EU Summit I02 
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Finally, in order to reach all these goals, the US created the US.-Ukraine 
Kuchrna-Gore binational commission. As Sherman Garnett has pointed out, 
“In September 1996, the U.S. and Ukraine agreed to create a binational 
cornmission, chaired by Vice-president A1 Gore and President Kuchma respectively. This 
commission consist of four committees dealing with foreign policy, security, trade and 
investment and other economic  issue^.^"^^ 
Sherman Garnett in Ukraine in the World. Ed. Lubomyr A. Hajda, Harvard Ukrainian Studies. I04 
Vol. XX (1996) Special issue (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard 
University, 1996), 114. 
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VI. DECLINE OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP OR THE LIMITATIONS OF 
PREVENTIVE DEFENSE APPROACH 
This thesis argues that the U.S.-Ukrainian strategic partnership is in a process of 
decline. Even though the United States continues to recognize Ukraine’s importance and 
supports Kyiv in many important‘spheres, many of Washington’s experts and policy 
makers are disappointed with Ukrainian reforms. *05 The bilateral military cooperation has 
continued its dynamic development, but it will not be sustained without a strong 
economic dimension and serious US .  engagement in this process. The election of the 
new President in Russia and new developments in U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations 
raise many concerns about future American approaches to Ukraine. 
The first factor that has contributed to decline in the relationship is the situation of 
the economic reforms in Ukraine. The American position on the importance of economic 
reforms in Ukraine was clear from the very beginning of the strategic partnership. 
According to John P. Hardt, 
The balance sheet on Ukrainian systemic reform with respect to actions 
needed to assure future independence, sovereignty, peace and prosperity to 
Ukraine is mixed. Future assurance of Ukrainian independence and 
sovereignty depends in large part on success of economic and political 
reform. Strong reform prospects may substantially improve the lot of 
Ukrainian citizens and encourage profitable American and other foreign 
investments. Continued sovereignty and independence should make 
Ukraine a stabilizing force in East European politics.Io6 
lo’ This finding is based on the author’s interviews in Washington, D.C., February 21-March 3, 
2000. 
Hardt, John P., Ukraine’s independence, Sovereignty and Progress in Political and Economic 
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I06 
Reform. (CRS Report for Congress. Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 30 August 1996), 1. 
Economic dimensions continue to be among the most important factors in U.S. 
policy regarding Ukraine. According to the October 1998 National Security Strategy 
approved by the U.S. President, 
Ukraine is at an important point in its economic transition-one that will 
affect its integration with Europe and domestic prosperity. The United 
States has mobilized the international community’s support for Ukrainian 
economic reform, pushed to improve Ukraine’s investment climate, and 
championed its integration into key European, transatlantic and global 
economic institutions. Two other challenges stand out: first, to instill 
respect for the rule of law so that a more transparent, level economic 
playing field is established and democratic governance prevails; and, 
second, to gain international support as it seeks to close down Chernobyl 
and reform its energy sector. The U.S.-Ukraine Binational Commission, 
chaired by Vice President Gore and President Kuchma, serves as a focal 
point to coordinate bilateral relations and to invigorate Ukrainian reform 
efforts. ’07 
Current views in the United States of Ukraine’s economic prospects tend to be 
pessimistic. There is a strong position among Washington experts that Ukraine has not 
successfully pursued economic reforms. Problems with corruption are considered one of 
the main negative factors in U.S.-Ukrainian bilateral relations.’08 Without addressing the 
accuracy of these issues, this argument seems weak because the United States has 
engaged in relationships with Russia, China, and other countries with significant 
corruption. This thesis argues that the Western “Ukraine light” approach, during a 
period when the United States and its allies have not wanted to invest resources in 
Ukraine and have pursued only a limited engagement in reforms in Ukraine, is the main 
factor that contributed to this result. 
~ 
A National Security Strategy for a New Century (The White House. October 1998), 41 I07 
This finding is based on the author’s interviews in Washington, D.C., February 21-March 3, I08 
2000. 
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In contrast, the programs in the military and security sphere have made significant 
progress. This circumstance shows that the security and defense sphere has been 
America’s priority in comparison to the economic dimension. U.S.-Ukrainian 
achievements in the sphere of bilateral and multilateral political-military cooperation 
support this judgement. This sphere has received the most favorable attention and support 
from the security and defense establishment of the United States. On the other hand, the 
United States has been almost disengaged in the sphere of Ukraine’s economic reforms. 
For example, the briefing materials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Under Secretary for Policy, prepared for the Joint Staffs NIS Conference of February 
2000 show that the Department of Defense’s view of Ukraine is positive; and the 
progress in bilateral military cooperation has become prominent and sustainable over the 
long-term. This document describes a politico-military vision for Ukraine as follows: 
Ukraine is an independent and sovereign nation, fulfilling its legitimate 
security needs and playing a constructive role in promoting regional 
political, military, and economic stability, including cooperation with 
international and regional security organizations. To this end, Ukraine has 
a rationally-developed, civilian-controlled defense establishment 
increasingly interoperable with Euro-Atlantic security organizations. lo9 
Furthermore, this document shows that the program of bilateral cooperation has 
been developed for the long-term and that the U.S. Department of Defense has a 
particular role in its realization. The program sets objectives for the next five years of 
cooperation and beyond 2005. To illustrate this point, after one year it intends to achieve 
the following results: “better align events with programs; build more quality programs- 
jointly; energize [the] NATO-Ukraine relationship.” After five years, the program aims to 
Engaging Ukraine: The Keystone in the Arch. Briefing, Office of Secretary of Defense, 109 
Undesecretary for Policy, Joint Staffs NIS Conference, February 2000, 10. 
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meet the following goals: “initial programs bear measurable results; engagement is 
institutionalized; Ukraine is a premier Partner with NATO.” Beyond 2005, the following 
objectives are envisaged: “Ukraine’s national security establishment is a progressive 
force in national defense and nation building; period of formative engagement [leading 
to] partnership; Ukraine is a constructive regional leader.”’” 
Another illustration of the same approach is the statement of the U.S. Secretary of 
State, Madeleine K. Albright, at the Ministerial Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine 
Commission in Florence, Italy, on 25 May 2000. The Secretary, emphasizing the 
importance of the distinctive partnership between Ukraine and NATO for stability in 
Europe, stressed the necessity of further economic and defense reforms in Ukraine, 
Changes this basic will take courage. But these steps clearly are required. 
Just as NATO is adapting and enlarging to meet the needs of a world 
transformed, so must Ukraine’s defense establishment adapt as well. Since 
we first came together in Madrid, the progress of this partnership has been 
a quiet success story. But the time has come to accelerate this progress. 
We must move from making plans and pledges to carrying out 
commitments.’ ’ 
In fact, Mrs. Albright’s references to Ukraine’s participation in KFOR, SFOR and 
the Partnership for Peace program as well as the deployment of the Ukrainian-Polish 
Peacekeeping battalion planned for July 2000 show the significant achievements in 
interoperability and cooperation between the NATO and Ukraine armed forces, and 
security and defense establishments, since this area became a priority in 1994. In contrast, 
how many Ukrainian factories and companies (not speaking about entire industries) have 
1 
Ibid., 18-20. I10 
Albright, Madeleine K. Statement at the Ministerial Meeting of the NA TO-Ukraine I l l  
Commission. Florence, Italy, 25 May 2000; available [online] 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/sOOO525i.htm; accessed 1 June 2000. 
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become interoperable with American and other Western business and industrial partners 
in the same period of time? It was not only America’s defense and security support to 
Germany and Japan after World War I1 that helped these nations recover. American 
investments in industrial development and trade in these countries helped to make them 
stable and prosperous. Interoperability of their armed forces was one of the lower priority 
issues and benefited allies later. Ukraine, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its 
unified and ineffective economic system, faces similar difficult economic challenges. 
These examples show that there is an imbalance between the U.S. military and 
security approach to Ukraine and the U.S. economic programs, which are self-limited by 
the “Ukraine light” approach. It is unclear whether this inconsistency is a product of the 
latest strategic approaches built on the Preventive Defense concept described by Ashton 
B. Carter and William J. Perry. 
As a guide to national security strategy, Preventive Defense is 
fundamentally different from deterrence: it is a broad politico-military 
strategy, and therefore it draws on all the instruments of foreign policy: 
political, economic, and military. But the role of the U.S. Department of 
Defense is central: the department’s contacts with counterpart militaries in 
Russia, China, and Europe will influence their views of themselves and 
thus their propensity to threaten U S ,  interests.”* 
If the current U.S. strategic approaches are based on the Preventive Defense 
concept, in which the DOD plays the key role in bilateral cooperation, these approaches 
seem limited and unbalanced. This is because the U S .  defense and security establishment 
is trying to deal only with security and defense issues while neglecting the economic 
Carter, Ashton B. and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for 1 I2 
Americ. (Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution Press, 1999), 18. 
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dimension. Moreover, the DOD’s involvement, even limited, in the sphere of economic 
reforms will probably not lead to the desired results. 
Another factor of continuing significance in U.S.-Ukrainian relations is Russia. 
The circumstances have changed after the election of Vladimir Putin as President of 
Russia and the Duma’s ratification of START 11. The ambitious U.S.-Russian arms 
control agenda could in some circumstances return the “Ukrainian issue” to the forefront 
in relations between America and Russia. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This thesis concludes that several significant factors challenge the U.S.-Ukrainian 
strategic partnership. The prominence of the vital strategic interests connected to nuclear 
weapons may lower the relative significance of U.S.-Ukrainian relations. Accusations of 
corruption and slowness in Ukraine’s economic reforms have extended the distance 
between Washington and Kyiv at a time when the Washington-Moscow strategic 
dialogue may become more prominent. 
This thesis argues that the “Preventive Defense” approach and the previous vision 
of strategic partnership based on security and defense support to Ukraine (including 
bilateral US.-Ukraine and multilateral Ukraine-NATO cooperation) with the “Ukraine 
light scenario” (limited Western engagement in Ukrainian reforms and economic 
assistance) led to the mixed outcome. This outcome features good bilateral and 
multilateral military and security cooperation in conjunction with a weak, limited, and 
corrupted economic dimension. 
It is necessary to emphasize that two schools of American strategic culture 
struggle for influence over U.S. security policy toward Eastern Europe and Eurasia. The 
first school traditionally emphasizes the relations with Russia for reasons of nuclear 
disarmament or geopolitics. The second school recognizes the necessity of building long- 
term sustainable relations with Ukraine and the newly independent states. Both directions 
require long-term commitments and resources. With drastically limited foreign aid funds 
and commitments of the U.S. government and the arms control agenda at stake, the 
second, regional, direction becomes dependent on the first, more vital one. Ukraine 
became a model for post-Soviet states, because it has committed itself to Western 
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democratic values for the last ten years and has become an example of cooperation with 
the West for countries such as Georgia, Moldova, and others. With the current U.S. 
administration’s approaches, this direction is likely to become dependent on the 
traditional approach holding that “Russia is more important.” Even if the Euro-American 
“Russia only” approach failed, there could still be reasons to hope for the emancipation 
and democratization of Russia with time. In contrast, the failure of “Ukraine as a model” 
could lead to a chain of negative consequences not only for Russia and other NIS, but 
also for the West. Attempts to balance the Preventive Defense model with a limited 
economic dimension will inevitably lead to the failure of the “Ukraine as a model” 
approach. 
A. AMERICA’S POSSIBLE FUTURE STRATEGIC APPROACH TO UKRAINE 
America’s possible future strategic approach to Ukraine will depend-among 
other factors-on the situation in Russia, the progress of Ukrainian economic reforms, 
and developments in the United States itself. If the situation in Russia features a stable 
process of democratization, and if promising arms control negotiations are underway, the 
U.S. attention to Ukraine may decrease. In these circumstances a return to the scenario of 
improved U.S.-Russian relations at Ukraine’s expense might be conceivable. Kyiv might 
then lose its importance for American strategists. 
The situation in Russia may, however, be unpredictable for the West because of 
the continuing economic crisis, which continues to damage internal stability with effects 
on nuclear and security issues. The U.S. strategic approach to Ukraine in this case may be 
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a mixture of “strategic pivot” and “multinational and institutional support” with the 
“Ukraine Light” scenario. 
In terms of the future of U.S.-Ukrainian relations, Sherman Garnett identified four 
main obstacles: 
[l] Ukraine’s internal political and economic situation; .... [2] the state of 
Ukrainian-Russian relations.. . . [3] [the fact that] key European states and 
institutions have yet to acknowledge Ukraine’s strategic significance or to 
fashion policies which are commensurate with that significance.. . . [4] the 
instability of the current U.S. policy consensus on Ukraine.’ l3  
Another possibility deserves consideration. Future U.S. policy may be more 
oriented than the present approach toward the management of the “Russian threat.” In 
this case, Ukrainian integration into the transatlantic and European structures may 
become essential. The official U.S. approach in this case is to keep an “open door” for 
possible future Ukrainian NATO membership. According to U.S. Deputy Secretary of 
State Strobe Talbott, “We respect and accept Ukraine’s position that NATO membership 
is not on its agenda at this time.. .But we also believe that should Ukraine one day decide 
to seek entry into the Alliance, the door will remain open.”’ l 4  
In support of Ukraine’s stabilization, the United States continue to provide 
incentives for economic reforms. In the words of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, 
Sherman W. Garnett in Ukraine in the World. Ed. Lubomyr A. Hajda, Haward Ukrainian I13 
Studies. Vol. XX ( 1996) Special issue (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard 
University, 1996), 115-1 17. 
Talbott, Strobe. The New Ukraine in the New Europe. Address at the Workshop on Ukraine - 1 I4 
NATO Relations sponsored by the Harvard University Project on Ukrainian Security and the Stanford- 
Harvard Preventive Defense Project . Washington, 8 April 1998; available [online] 
http://www.state.gov/www/policy-remarks/ 1998/980408-talbott_ukr_nato.html; accessed 4 June 2000. 
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Ukraine must pursue the economic and political reforms that will bring 
the prosperity and stability it needs to be a full and reliable partner. 
Market democracy is a key aspect of Ukraine’s integration into the 
Euro-Atlantic community, and all of us here are committed to ensuring 
that it succeeds. 115 
In this case, the economic dimension of the U.S. approaches to Ukraine should 
become one of the main priorities. 
In addition, the United States will encourage Ukraine to urge Russia to be more 
cooperative with NATO. As Talbott has observed, “Under both Presidents Kravchuk and 
Kuchma, Ukraine has been generally supportive of NATO’s efforts to reach out to 
Russia-and rightly so. After all, it is very much in Ukraine’s interest that Russian 
reform and integration with the West remain on course. 9,  116 
The current American approaches differ from those in the mid-l990s, when the 
question of a possible Ukrainian neutral status was frequently evoked. The current 
approaches are mainly focused on the development of the NATO-Ukraine partnership 
and possible Ukrainian membership in NATO and the EU.’I7 In addition, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski has suggested that the link between Ukraine and a trilateral pivot in Europe 
may be important for future Ukrainian security. 
In the meantime, it is likely that Franco-German-Polish collaboration 
within the EU and NATO will have deepened considerably, especially in 
Albright, Madeleine K., Statement at the Ministerial Meeting of the NATO- 115 
Ukraine Commission Brussels, Belgium, December 9, 1998; available [online] 
http://secretary,state.gov/www/statements/1998/98 1209a.html; accessed 6 June 2000. 
Talbott, Strobe, The New Ukraine in the New Europe, Address at the Workshop on Ukraine - 116 
NATO Relations sponsored by the Harvard University Project on Ukrainian Security and the Stanford- 
Harvard Preventive Defense Project , Washington, 8 April 1998; available [online] 
http://www.state.gov/www/policy-remarks/1998/980408-talbott-ukr-nato.html; accessed 4 June 2000. 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic 117 
Imperatives (New York: BasicBooks, 1997), 84. 
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the area of defense.. . Given the special geopolitical interest of Germany 
and Poland in Ukraine’s independence, it is also quite possible that 
Ukraine will gradually be drawn into the special Franco-German-Polish 
relationship. By the year 20 10, Franco-German-Polish-Ukrainian political 
collaboration, engaging some 230 million people, could evolve into a 
partnership enhancing Europe’s geostrategic depth. ”* 
There are other modalities of U.S. cooperation with Ukraine. These include U.S.- 
Polish-Ukraine cooperation and U.S.-Turkish-Ukraine cooperation, but they will not be 
sustained along without comprehensive and balanced long-term economic and political I 
support to Ukraine. 
The “Ukrainian question” is ultimately an aspect of the “Russian question” for 
many American strategists. Continuing instability in Russia and its protracted struggle 
with the United States about the vision of the new international order and European 
affairs will in all likelihood keep the “Ukrainian question” on the strategic agenda of 
American policy. In fact, U.S. policy toward Ukraine has become a long-term strategic 
approach because of these factors. The U.S.-Ukrainian strategic partnership can not be 
sustained, however, without a balanced economic dimension. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
For most of the twentieth century Ukraine was not a part of the U.S. strategic 
agenda. Even though American decision-makers were well-informed about the existence 
and nature of “the Ukrainian question,” “the moral foundations” of U.S. strategic culture 
ignored the necessity to support the Ukrainian movement toward independence. 
Furthermore, President Bush initially supported Gorbachev and Yeltsin against Ukraine, 
and reacted negatively to any kind of Ukrainian independence movement. The United 
‘ I8  Ibid., 85 
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States recognized the independence of Ukraine because of the strategic necessity 
(including START I and START 11) and not because of the moral imperative. 
The U.S. approach changed again during the first Clinton administration in 
accordance with a new strategic necessity-Russian instability. Another crucial factor in 
the United States strategic approach to Ukraine is therefore geopolitical necessity, which 
is based on uncertainty about Russia’s future security policy. 
The United States is helping to secure Ukrainian independence because the 
stabilization of Ukraine and its integration into the key transatlantic and European 
institutions will help to prevent Russia from regaining its former Eurasian hegemony. 
Ukraine’s independence also reinforces the NATO enlargement process, and enhances 
American weight in the former Soviet space. 
American-Ukrainian ties have developed in parallel with uncertainty about the 
future of Russia and its opposition to NATO enlargement and other NATO (and U.S.) 
policies. U.S. strategists eventually recognized the important role of an independent and 
stable Ukraine for the security of the NATO enlargement process as well as for the 
hstration of Russian efforts to create an anti-NATO military bloc on the basis of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. 
The strategic partnership between the United States and Ukraine will probably 
decline if the economic dimension of the U.S. approach is not strengthened to balance the 
military and security dimensions. 
It is unclear what future strategic necessities will shape the U.S. approach to 
Ukraine. The significance of Ukraine for American strategists may increase because of 
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events in Russia, or it may decrease because of other factors, such as the further 
implementation of the START process and the creation of new national antiballistic 
missile capabilities. Ukraine will nonetheless probably continue to be the strategic partner 
or the “strategic pivot” of the United States in the former Soviet space for at least the next 
ten years. 
It is clear that the current U.S. approach can not be sustained for a long period 
because it is economically unbalanced. Prescriptive solutions are not popular in academic 
research, but a responsible scholar should examine alternatives and address possible 
solutions. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program showed the post-Cold War world 
methods of cooperation between former adversaries in the sphere of security and defense. 
There is a strong necessity for a similar program for international economic cooperation 
with broad business involvement. For example, a multinational program such as a 
Business Partnership for Reforms and Democracy (BPRD), similar to PfP in its weight 
and value, would not only balance America’s “Preventive Defense” approach, in 
conjunction with NATO and EU enlargement, but would also bolster already existing 
local and regional economic initiatives such as those dealing with the transportation of 
Caspian Sea Basin oil, and with Black Sea and Eastern European economic cooperation. 
In this way, the transatlantic partnership process and the EU integration process 
would no longer exclude countries, but would gain a new mission in Eastern Europe and 
Eurasia. The possible integration of PfP and the proposed BPRD could lead to a post- 
Cold War Marshall Plan model with the involvement of many countries and business 
organizations on the Western side. It would not rely solely on American foreign aid funds 
and the U.S. defense and security establishment. It could involve multinational 
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corporations and international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. 
It is not proposed here that states would control business and market activities, but 
governments, supporting the BPRD in international structures like the G-7, NATO, and 
the EU, could help to focus international economic initiatives and corporations on the 
quest for local reforms and business solutions. Moreover, such a balance between 
geopolitics and new global economic trends could decrease the threat of new dividing 
lines in Europe and diminish the risks of Russian isolationism in a context of Russian 
opposition to NATO and EU enlargement toward Russian and NIS borders. 
Without such a comprehensive and balanced approach, there is a strong 
possibility of the repetition of the pre-World War I1 cordon sanitaire approach, based on 
a sort of preventive defense approach. This could lead to new Munichs and regional 
struggles. These struggles could arise if the West failed to extend its economic and 
security commitments. In such circumstances, Russia might try to regain control over 
Eastern Europe and Eurasia, especially if the EU and NATO tried to “close the door” to 
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